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Millions of agricultural producers from around the globe now cultivate 
genetically modified (GM) crops. In both the United States and the 
European Union, these crops and their food and feed products must be 
approved after evaluations designed to protect health, the environment, and 
agriculture. In the United States, federal agencies implement the 
authorisation process; in the European Community, both Community 
institutions and Member State authorities play roles. This article describes 
the comprehensive regulatory provisions that govern GM crops and their 
products under US and EC law. The article then compares requirements in 
the two legal systems, with a focus on the process of authorisation, 
requirements for labelling, and the exercise of precaution in the regulatory 
process. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, genetic engineering has resulted in the development of a 
number of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many of these are 
genetically modified (or genetically engineered) (GM) crops. These crops and 
their products are used for food and feed.1
                                                 
∗ Bock Chair and Professor of Agricultural Law, Department of Agricultural and Consumer 
Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This material is based on work 
supported by the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, US Department of Agriculture, 
under Hatch Project No ILLU-470-309. Part III of this article is derived in part, with 
permission, from Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘The Coexistence of GM and Other Crops in the 
European Union’ (2007) 16 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 324 and Part II from a 
section of a draft article (supported by a grant from the Danish Social Science Research 
Council) by Margaret Rosso Grossman and Helle Tegner Anker. 
 Though GMOs are subject to 
1 GMOs and their food products are the focus of this article. Other GMOs produce 
pharmaceutical compounds and industrial chemicals, which raise additional regulatory issues. 
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regulatory measures, as they are tested, commercialised, cultivated, and 
consumed, they are controversial. Many agricultural producers value the traits 
– herbicide tolerance and insect pest or disease resistance – that GM crops 
offer, but some consumers and environmentalists have expressed concern 
about possible threats to human health or the environment. Consumers who 
doubt the safety of GM foods prefer not to purchase those foods or at least to 
have the freedom to choose between GM and non-GM food products. 
Global cultivation of GM crops has increased rapidly since 1996, when 
farmers in only six countries grew fewer than three million hectares of these 
crops. In 2008, farmers in 25 countries grew biotech crops, and the global area 
of cultivation reached 125 million hectares – a 9.4 per cent increase over 
2007. Soybeans, grown on 65.8 million hectares globally, were the principal 
GM crop, followed by corn, cotton, and canola. In terms of traits, the majority 
of biotech crops, grown on 79 million hectares, provided herbicide tolerance. 
Crops with ‘stacked’ double or triple traits (for example, both herbicide 
tolerance and insect resistance) grew on 26.9 million acres, and insect 
resistant varieties, on 19.1 million hectares.2
The United States planted half (62.5 million) of the world’s total hectares of 
GM crops. Other countries that grew more than one million hectares in 2008 
were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, China, Paraguay, and South Africa. 
About 13.3 million farmers cultivated biotech crops; of these 12.3 million 
were in developing countries, with the majority of these farmers growing Bt 
cotton
 
3 in China (7.1 million), India (5 million), and other developing 
countries. Indeed, between 1996 and 2008, developing countries have grown 
an increasing proportion of global biotech crops.4
In the United States, biotech crops make up a large majority of soybeans (91 
per cent), maize (85 per cent) and cotton (88 per cent).
 
5
                                                 
2 Clive James, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, ISAAA 
Brief 39-2008: Executive Summary, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 
2008 The First Thirteen Years, 1996 to 2008 <http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/ 
briefs/39/executivesummary/default.html> at 26 October 2009. 
 In the European 
Union, where only genetically modified maize (Bt maize) has been approved 
for cultivation, biotech crops are far less prevalent. In 2008, EU farmers 
cultivated only about 108 000 hectares of Bt maize, an increase of 21 per cent 
over 2007, but still only slightly more than one per cent of total maize 
3 Bt crops are those that have been genetically engineered to produce a natural insecticide that 
derives from the Bt bacterium, bacillus thuringiensis. 
4 James, above n 2, 4, 8. 
5 National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), United States Department of Agriculture, 
Acreage 24–5 (30 June 2009) <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/Acre/Acre-06-30-
2009.pdf> at 26 October 2009. 
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production. Spanish farmers cultivated the largest number of hectares, and 
farmers in six other EU Member States – the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Portugal, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia – also grew biotech maize.6 Most 
EU Member States have no officially recognised GM hectares, and several 
(for example, Austria, Hungary, France) have attempted to ban cultivation of 
GM maize.7
In both the United States and the European Union, the cultivation of 
genetically modified crops must coexist with other agricultural systems.
 
8
In the United States, where GM crops make up a large majority of important 
crops such as soybeans and maize, the rate of adoption indicates that 
producers are enthusiastic about the benefits of GM crops. Consumers, in 
contrast, often lack specialised knowledge about biotechnology and its food 
products.
 
Many producers use conventional or traditional systems and often apply 
fertilizers and pesticides on their crops. Organic systems do not usually use 
chemical fertilizers or pesticides, nor do they use GM materials in the 
production process. When GM, conventional, and organic systems of 
agricultural production occur in the same geographic region, producers who 
use organic or conventional systems often want to avoid the ‘adventitious 
presence’ of GM material in their crops. The coexistence of GM with 
traditional and organic farming is therefore a contentious issue, particularly in 
the European Union. 
9 Nonetheless, according to survey results published in 2008, the 
majority of US consumers would purchase food developed from 
biotechnology, especially if it offered specific benefits. About 84 per cent of 
consumers expressed a favourable or neutral impression of plant 
biotechnology. Moreover, only one per cent of respondents listed 
biotechnology as a primary food-safety concern.10
Although EC policy favours development of biotechnology, including GM 
agricultural crops,
   
11
                                                 
6 James, above n 2, 10–11. 
 those crops and their products have not received a warm 
7 See Part IIIB of this article. 
8 Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, ‘Peaceful Coexistence Among Growers of 
Genetically Engineered, Conventional, and Organic Crops’ (Speech delivered at the Pew 
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Washington DC, 1–2 March 2006) 7. 
9 See William K Hallman and W Carl Hebden, ‘American Opinions of GM Food: Awareness, 
Knowledge, and Implications for Education’ (2005) 20(4) Choices 239. 
10 International Food Information Council, 2008 Food Biotechnology: A Study of U.S. 
Consumer Trends (2008), Executive Summary 2, 4 <http://www.ific.org/research/upload/ 
Executive-Summary-Biotech-Report_Website-version.pdf> at 26 October 2009. 
11 See generally Commission of the European Communities (EC), Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
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welcome from governments, producers or consumers.12 The EU 
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development noted that tensions in 
Europe about GMOs often reflect different goals.13 Farmers who focus on 
enhanced competitiveness see an important role for GMOs, while others 
prefer traditional or organic practices and fear economic harm from the 
adventitious presence of GM material. Some European consumers value 
‘quality production’ and products ‘linked to traditional practices and 
geographical origin’; others prefer organic foods.14 These values are 
consistent with the European model of agriculture that balances socio-
economic, as well as environmental and territorial considerations. Some 
consumers believe that GMOs are not compatible with traditional production. 
Indeed, an organisation called GMO-free Europe calculated that 289 regions 
in Europe have declared themselves GM-free or would like to restrict GM 
crops, and 4567 local governments would also like to restrict GM in their 
territories.15
The following Parts of this article describe the regulatory systems for GMOs 
and GM food (and feed) in the United States and the European Union and 
provide a brief comparison of regulatory approaches in the United States and 
Europe. 
 
                                                                                                                    
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid Term Review of the Strategy on Life 
Sciences and Biotechnology COM (2007) 175 final (10 April 2007). 
12 A survey indicated that 58 per cent of Europeans (a majority in most Member States) oppose 
use of GMOs, though lack of information may contribute to the opposition: European 
Commission, Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment (Special 
Eurobarometer 295 (2008)), 65–6. 
13 Friends of the Earth Europe, an NGO suspicious of GM technology, asserted that: ‘GMO 
contamination is a new type of pollution created by industry. It involves living and replicating 
organisms, and because it involves the building blocks of life (genes), is irreversible as well as 
increasing over time. It can occur at any stage along the food chain as a result of natural 
processes and human intervention: from seed production, to crop growing, to harvesting, to 
storage, to transport, to processing and packaging.’  Friends of the Earth Europe, Contaminate 
or legislate? European Commission Policy on ‘Coexistence’ (2006) 1 <http://www.foeeurope. 
org/publications/2006/contaminate_or_legislate.pdf> at 25 March 2009. 
14 M Fischer Boel and J Pröll, ‘Concluding Remarks’ (Speech delivered at the EU Conference, 
‘Co-existence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops – Freedom of 
Choice’, Vienna, 5–6 April 2006) <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/vienna2006/index_ 
en.htm> at 26 March 2009. 
15 GMO-free Europe, GMO-free Regions and Local Areas in Europe (2009) <http://www.gmo-
free-regions.org/gmo-free-regions.html> at 26 April 2009. Regions include provinces, 
prefectures, and departments. In addition, 30,370 individuals are GMO-free. 
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II REGULATION OF GM CROPS AND FOOD PRODUCTS IN 
 THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, federal policy, laws, and regulations govern testing and 
commercialisation of crops and food produced through biotechnology. 
Developers of new GM varieties comply with federal laws and regulations 
and they participate in consultations recommended by federal agency 
guidelines. Federal regulation focuses on plant health, environmental 
protection, and food and feed safety. Though states share these concerns, most 
states agree that the federal government should bear primary responsibility in 
these areas,16 and states play no statutory role in federal regulation of GM 
crops.17 Many states have enacted general or specific statutory provisions that 
apply to biotechnology,18
A Policy 
 but this article focuses on the comprehensive federal 
regulation of biotechnology. 
The 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
established US policy for GMOs, and the Coordinated Framework continues 
to influence federal policy. Recognising important commercial opportunities 
from biotechnology, the Coordinated Framework acknowledged questions 
about the adequacy of existing laws, regulations, and review processes for 
products of biotechnology.19 Ultimately, the Coordinated Framework 
concluded that products of biotechnology are not fundamentally different 
from conventional products; that the product, rather than the process, should 
be regulated; and that regulatory jurisdiction over products of biotechnology 
(as over traditional products) should be based on their use.20
                                                 
16 Michael R Taylor, Jody S Tick and Diane M Sherman, Tending the Fields: State and Federal 
Roles in the Oversight of Genetically Modified Crops (Report prepared for the Pew Initiative 
on Food and Biotechnology, Washington DC, 2004) 21–2. 
 
17 States receive notice of regulatory activity (for example, when GM plants are moved into 
specific states), and the USDA provides information to states before field tests. Some state 
agencies would like to play a more active role in the regulatory process, perhaps in 
cooperation with federal agencies. For information on state authority, see generally Doug 
Farquhar and Liz Meyer, ‘State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology under the Federal 
Coordinated Framework’ (2007) 12 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 439. 
18 These laws help to promote specific state interests that include ‘health and environmental 
concerns, capturing the economic benefits of biotechnology, preserving market access, and 
responding to citizens and stakeholders’: Taylor, Tick and Sherman, above n 16, 22. 
19 Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed Reg 23,302 (26 June 1986) (‘Coordinated Framework’). The 
OSTP drafted the document with cooperation of administrative agencies. 
20 Ibid 23,303–04. 
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The Coordinated Framework relied on existing federal laws and agency 
expertise to govern GMOs. Three federal agencies carry out the most 
important responsibilities. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
ensures that GMOs are safe to grow; the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) ensures that they are safe for the environment; and the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA, along with the EPA) ensures that they 
are safe to eat.21 Policies articulated in the Coordinated Framework continue 
to influence Agency action, though new laws and regulations have been 
enacted since 1986.22
In recent years, development and field testing of new GM varieties have 
increased risks and triggered the need for new regulatory measures. A 2002 
policy document outlined plans of the lead agencies to strengthen regulation 
and enhance oversight.
 
23 The USDA had already made field testing 
requirements for permits more stringent for GMOs intended for 
pharmaceutical or industrial products (rather than commodity crops) and also 
planned to update its GM regulations.24
                                                 
21 Ibid 23,309–50, where agencies set out their policies for GMOs. In addition to the three 
leading agencies, the Coordinated Framework included policy from the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration for safety and health of workers and from the National Institutes of 
Health for conduct of research. Federal research supports the federal regulatory structure. 
 The FDA planned to publish 
guidelines to encourage the early evaluation of crops with new non-pesticidal 
proteins so that new crops would not raise food safety issues – caused, for 
example, by toxins or allergens that might escape into seeds, commodities, or 
food. The EPA planned to publish guidance on the conduct of safety reviews 
of low-level residues and containment controls during field trials and to 
review its requirements for experimental use permits and containment 
22 The Government Accountability Office recommended improvement in coordination of 
agency efforts and monitoring of GM crops: Government Accountability Office, Genetically 
Engineered Crops: Agencies Are Proposing Changes to Improve Oversight, but Could Take 
Additional Steps to Enhance Coordination and Monitoring (GAO-09-60, November 2008) 
(‘GAO, GE Crops’). 
23 Office of Science and Technology Policy, Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test 
Requirements for Biotechnology Derived Plants and to Establish Early Food Safety 
Assessments for New Proteins Produced by Such Plants, 67 Fed Reg 50,578 (2 August 2002) 
(‘OSTP, 2002 Policy’). Three principles form the basis of the 2002 regulatory proposals. 
First, the level of confinement for a field test should be consistent with the level of risk to the 
environment and health. Second, confinement measures for GM traits or proteins that present 
an unacceptable or unknown risk should be strict, and GM materials from the tests should be 
prohibited in seeds, commodities, and other products. Third, out-crossing and commingling 
should be minimised, but low levels of biotechnology-derived gene presence from field tests 
might be found acceptable. 
24 Ibid 50,580. USDA amendments would reflect recommendations from a National Research 
Council report, Environmental Effects of Transgenic Plants: The Scope and Adequacy of 
Regulation (2002). This article does not focus on crops that produce pharmaceutical or 
industrial compounds, which are subject to stricter regulation. 
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controls to minimise gene flow from field trials.25 These proposals were 
designed to reduce the unintended presence of low levels of GM material in 
seeds, commodities and food until safety standards had been met, and thus to 
protect public health and the environment and to increase public confidence in 
the effectiveness of regulatory oversight of GM foods.26
B  USDA – Plant Protection Act 
 Though some of 
these proposals have been carried out, others are still in progress. 
The United States Department of Agriculture regulatory framework is 
science-based and focuses on safe development and use of GM plants. The 
USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and its 
Biotechnology Regulatory Services govern interstate movement, import, field 
testing and eventual release of GM plants 
The USDA regulates GM plants under the Plant Protection Act of 2000,27 
which authorises the Agency to restrict the import, export, and movement in 
commerce of plant pests. Under the broad definition of ‘plant pest’ in APHIS 
regulations,28 most GMOs are materials that could harbour a plant pest and 
are therefore ‘regulated articles’ subject to USDA jurisdiction.29 APHIS 
regulations govern the introduction of regulated articles into the environment 
through field trials and their movement in interstate commerce. GMOs must 
be evaluated and determined to be ‘unregulated’ before they can be sold in 
commerce.30
1  Field Trials 
 
Field trials take place while a new crop is still a regulated article under the 
Plant Protection Act. Since 1993, the majority of field trials have followed the 
notification process,31
                                                 
25 OSTP, 2002 Policy, above n 23, 50,579. The EPA planned to continue to use its procedures 
that govern residues of pesticidal proteins in foods and to urge those developing new crops to 
seek approval for residues early in the development process. 
 designed for plants that do not present novel plant 
26 Ibid 50,578–9. 
27 7 USCA §§ 7701–7772 (West 1999 & Supp 2009); § 7711 authorizes regulation of plant 
pests. The Plant Protection Act replaced the Plant Pest and Plant Quarantine Acts, on which 
the USDA had relied for authority. 
28 7 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) § 340.1 (2009); see also 7 USC § 7702(14) (2006). 
29 A regulated article is an ‘organism which has been altered or produced through genetic 
engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or vector agent ... meets the 
definition of plant pest …’: 7 CFR § 340.1 (2009). 
30 See the discussion in Part IIB2 of this article.  
31 See USDA-APHIS Biotechnology Regulatory Services, User’s Guide: Notification (5 
February 2008) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/Notification_Guidance.pdf> at 25 March 
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risks.32 Regulations prescribe the procedure for notifying APHIS and the 
information required, including the location and size of the field test and 
technical data about the regulated article.33 Performance standards for field 
trials under the notification procedure help to ensure that the field trial will 
not cause environmental or economic harm. Anyone conducting a field trial 
must allow inspection of facilities and records and report results of field tests 
and any unusual occurrence to APHIS.34
The more rigorous permit procedure applies to experimental releases of GM 
plants that pose higher risks, for example, plants modified with certain human 
or animal genetic material and those that produce industrial or pharmaceutical 
compounds.
 
35 The permit requires detailed technical data and specific 
information about experimental design, geographic location, plans to prevent 
escape and dissemination, and final disposal.36 APHIS reviews the 
application37 and, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA),38
                                                                                                                    
2009. Between 1987 and 2007, APHIS authorised almost 19,000 notifications and 4,300 
permits; over 13,000 were for field trials: GAO, GE Crops, above n 22, 11. 
 prepares an environmental assessment followed, if necessary, by 
an environmental impact statement. After review of the application and 
accompanying data, APHIS will grant or deny (with reasons and subject to 
appeal) the permit. The permit will include conditions to ensure that 
introduction of the plant will not disseminate or establish plant pests. The 
permit holder must report the results of field tests and notify APHIS promptly 
32 7 CFR § 340.3(b)(1)–(6) (2008). Plants eligible for the notification process must not be listed 
as a noxious weed and the GM may not encode products for pharmaceutical or industrial use. 
Other technical requirements apply. 
33 7 CFR § 340.3(d)(2) (2008). APHIS acknowledges the notification within 30 days 
(340.3(e)(4)). Field tests that will last for more than one year require permits. APHIS, Policy 
Statement Regarding Releases of Perennials under Notification <http://www.aphis.usda.gov 
/brs/pdf/BRS_Perennials_Statement.pdf> at 25 March 2009. 
34 7 CFR § 340.3(c),(d)(5),(6) (2008). 
35 7 CFR § 340.3(b)(4)(iii) (2008). A person whose notification results in a denial of permission 
may also apply for a permit: at § 340.3(e)(5). 
36 7 CFR § 340.4(b)(1)–(14) (2008).  
37 7 CFR § 340.4(b) (2008). APHIS sends the completed permit application (but without trade 
secrets or confidential business information), along with its initial review, to the relevant state 
department of agriculture: at § 340.4(b). 
38 42 USC §§ 4321–4370f (2006). NEPA requires federal agencies to integrate environmental 
values into the process of decision making. Federal agencies must prepare a detailed 
environmental impact statement for ‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment’: at § 4332(2)(C). 
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of accidental or unauthorised releases, unexpected characteristics of the 
organism, and other unusual occurrences.39
2  Petitions for Deregulation 
 
When field tests indicate that a new GM variety is not a plant pest and poses 
no threat to agriculture or the environment, the variety is ready to be 
commercialised. The next step is a petition for determination of ‘nonregulated 
status’.40 The petition explains why the organism should no longer be 
regulated. The applicant provides detailed information about the organism, 
including information that would be ‘unfavorable to a petition’.41 Results of 
field tests are an important part of the petition, and data must substantiate the 
conclusion that the GM plant is ‘unlikely to pose a greater plant pest risk than 
the unmodified organism from which it was derived’.42
APHIS reviews the risk of the regulated variety to determine whether it can be 
released safely into the environment. Review includes an environmental 
assessment, required under NEPA. If the assessment results in a finding of no 
significant impact,
 
43
                                                 
39 7 CFR § 340.4(f) (2008). More stringent requirements accompany permits for GE crops with 
pharmaceutical and industrial uses. See Biotechnology Regulatory Services, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Guidance for APHIS Permits for Field Testing or Movement of 
Organisms Intended for Pharmaceutical or Industrial Use (July 2008) 
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/Pharma_Guidance.pdf> at 24 March 2009. In September 
2007, APHIS’ Biotechnology Regulatory Services announced a new program to help 
applicants approved to introduce GM organisms ‘to develop sound management practices and 
to enhance compliance’ with APHIS regulations and permit requirements: Biotechnology 
Regulatory Services, APHIS, ‘The Biotechnology Quality Management System’ (Factsheet, 
June 2008) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/content/printable_ 
version/fs_qms_brs_08.pdf> at 20 October 2009. In January 2009, APHIS introduced a pilot 
project under which five volunteer participants will develop quality management systems to 
manage field releases: APHIS, ‘USDA Launches Biotechnology Quality Management System 
Pilot Project’ (Press Release, 16 January 2009). 
 no environmental impact statement is required; if the 
40 7 CFR § 340.6 (2008). 
41 7 CFR § 340.6(b) (2008). Data requirements include experimental data, unpublished studies, 
and scientific literature. The applicant must describe the conventional plant, the regulated 
article (the GM plant), and differences between them. 
42 7 CFR § 340.6(c)(4) (2008). Data to meet this standard includes ‘Plant pest risk 
characteristics, disease and pest susceptibilities, expression of the gene product, new enzymes, 
or changes to plant metabolism, weediness of the regulated article…[and other information]. 
Any information known to the petitioner that indicates that a regulated article may pose a 
greater plant pest risk than the unmodified recipient organism shall also be included’: at § 
340.6(c)(4). 
43 APHIS prepares a preliminary assessment, then accepts and reviews public comments before 
preparation of the final assessment. Further NEPA analysis to address concerns about the use 
of regulated products will be done by the agency that reviews or approves the product, taking 
into account the APHIS review. 
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variety may have a significant impact, APHIS must prepare an environmental 
impact statement.44 On the basis of the environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement and other documentation, APHIS makes the 
determination of nonregulated status or, less often, denies the petition.45 If the 
petition is granted, the organism can move freely in commerce, provided that 
it also meets the regulatory requirements of the FDA and EPA. As of 
February 2009, APHIS had granted 75 petitions, and 14 were pending.46
Because nonregulated status means that a variety poses no environmental or 
agricultural risk, APHIS no longer has authority over that variety. Should it 
later become a plant pest, however, it will again be subject to regulation.
  
47
3  APHIS Policy for Low-Level Gene Mixing 
 
Plant breeding, both in conventional and GM plants, sometimes results in 
‘low-level mixing of genes and gene products from unintended plant 
sources’.48
                                                 
44 A recent court decision held that the failure of APHIS to prepare an environmental impact 
statement for a GM feed, glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa, did not comply with NEPA. The court 
vacated APHIS’ determination of nonregulated status and ordered APHIS to prepare an 
environmental impact statement before it acts on the petition for deregulation. The court also 
enjoined planting of the alfalfa: Geertson Seed Farms, Inc v Mike Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, 
2007 WL 1302981 (ND Cal) (‘Geertson’). In September 2008, the US Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction against planting the alfalfa, pending APHIS’ 
preparation of the environmental impact statement and action on the petition to deregulate: 
541 F3d 938 (9th Cir 2008), amended and superseded by 570 F3d 1130 (9th Cir 2009). For 
more information on Geertson and other decisions involving GMOs and NEPA, see Margaret 
Rosso Grossman, ‘Genetically Modified Food and Feed and the US National Environmental 
Policy Act’ (2007) 3(6) European Feed and Food Law Review 373. See also Delaware 
Audubon Soc Inc v Secretary US Department of Interior, 612 F Supp 2d 442 (D Del 2009), 
enjoining cultivation of GM crops at Prime Hook National Wildlife Refuge until an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement is completed. 
 Moreover, natural processes (pollen movement) or human actions 
(for example, field testing or seed production) may introduce unauthorised 
GMOs into other products. Therefore, on the basis of practical experience, 
APHIS has articulated a policy for low-level gene mixing. 
45 7 CFR § 340.6(d),(f) (2008). 
46 The varieties, with links to relevant documents, are listed at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
brs/not_reg.html> at 24 March 2009. The earliest determination of non-regulated status was 
Calgene’s Flavr Savr tomato (1992). 
47 A GAO study recommended that the USDA, along with the EPA and FDA, develop a 
strategy to monitor GM crops that have been commercialised for effects on the environment, 
food safety, and traditional (non-GM) agriculture. The agencies plan to discuss a coordinated 
strategy for monitoring deregulated crops: GAO, GE Crops, above n 22, 24–34, 48. 
48 APHIS, USDA, APHIS Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated 
Genetically Engineered Plant Materials, 72 Fed Reg 14,649 (29 March 2007) (‘APHIS, Low-
Level Presence’). 
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Regulatory requirements minimise the likelihood of low-level presence of 
regulated GMOs in other crops. APHIS, in close cooperation with the EPA 
and FDA, responds to occurrences with ‘remedial action that is appropriate to 
the level of risk and warranted by the facts in each case’.49 When an incident 
would result in introduction or dissemination of a plant pest or threaten plant 
health or the environment, APHIS will require remediation measures, using its 
authority under the Plant Protection Act.50 APHIS will generally not require 
remedial measures if the regulated material comes from a plant that meets 
requirements for notification of field tests (and thus poses little risk) or if the 
plant is sufficiently similar to another plant that APHIS has already 
deregulated and therefore poses no significant safety risk to plant health or the 
environment.51
4  Proposed Regulations 
 
In July 2007, APHIS outlined possible amendments to its regulations for 
environmental release of GMOs and requested comments from the public.52 In 
connection with its regulatory review, APHIS compiled a list of ‘lessons 
learned’ from its experience in regulating biotechnology.53 In the May 2008 
Farm Bill, Congress directed the USDA to ‘take action on each issue 
identified in the document’ within eighteen months.54
                                                 
49 Ibid 14,650. The few reported unauthorised releases of GM crops have led to costly food 
recalls and lost trade: GAO, GE Crops, above n 22, 3 and 14–24. 
 
50 7 USC § 7714 (2006). APHIS regulatory actions do not preclude the EPA or FDA from using 
their legal authority to protect food safety, health and the environment: APHIS, Low-Level 
Presence, above n 48, 14,651. 
51 APHIS, Low-Level Presence, above n 48, 14,651. This policy applied in February 2008 and 
December 2008, when low levels of unauthorised GM corn (3 seeds per 1000) and GM cotton 
(small quantities) were found in other products: ‘USDA, EPA, and FDA Statement on 
Genetically Engineered Corn "Event 32"’ (Press Release, 22 February 2008); ‘FDA, EPA and 
USDA Conclude that Accidental Release of Genetically Engineered Cotton Poses No Safety 
Risk to Humans or Animals’ (Press Release, 3 December 2008). 
52 APHIS, Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms, Draft Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement – July 2007, Docket APHIS-2006-0112 
<http://www.regulations.gov> (‘APHIS, Draft EIS’); APHIS, Introduction of Organisms and 
Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering, 71 Fed Reg 39,021, 39,022 (17 
July 2007). 
53 USDA, ‘Lessons Learned and Revisions under Consideration for APHIS’ Biotechnology 
Framework’ (October 2007) (listing nine lessons and considerations for enhancing 
regulation).  
54 Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-246, § 10,204. The USDA must 
consider establishing a system of risk-based categories for regulated articles, means of 
identification (including retention of seed samples), and standards for isolation and 
containment. The USDA must also consider requiring permit holders to maintain a ‘positive 
chain of custody’ and to keep records. 
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In response to this congressional mandate, APHIS published comprehensive 
proposed regulations in October 2008. Its proposals, already under 
consideration when Congress required prompt regulatory action, are designed 
to respond to emerging trends in biotechnology, to address the current and 
future needs of the agency, to continue to ensure a high level of 
environmental protection, to improve regulatory processes so that they are 
more transparent to stakeholders and the public, to more efficiently use 
agency resources and to eliminate unnecessary regulatory burdens.55
APHIS proposed to expand its regulatory oversight under the Plant Protection 
Act beyond plant pests to include noxious weeds and biological control 
organisms.
 
56 In light of the increased variety of GM organisms, APHIS 
proposed to revise its permit system, establishing four permit categories 
(based on risk of persistence and potential harm) for environmental releases of 
GM plants and eliminating the notification procedure. New regulations would 
revise procedures for permit applications and establish permit conditions and 
obligations.57
In addition, proposed amendments would adapt the system of petitions for 
non-regulated status to the broadened scope of regulation and focus on 
whether the GMO is ‘unlikely to be a plant pest or noxious weed’.
 
58
                                                 
55 USDA, APHIS, Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release into the Environment of 
Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms 73 Fed Reg 60,008, 60,009 (9 October 2008), 
corrected at 73 Fed Reg 66,563 (10 November 2008), to be codified at 7 CFR pt 340 
(‘APHIS, 2008 Proposed Regulations’). The proposed regulations also respond to the 
recommendations in Office of the Inspector General, USDA, Audit Report: Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service Controls over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism 
Release Permits, Audit 50601-8-Te (2005) and to comments on the Draft EIS above n 52. The 
comment period on the proposal ended 31 June 2009: 74 Fed Reg 16,797 (13 April 2009). 
 APHIS 
also proposed a procedure for revoking an approval of non-regulated status 
and new measures to strengthen compliance (including stricter requirements 
for record keeping) and enforcement. APHIS may also enact a regulation on 
56 APHIS, 2008 Proposed Regulations, above n 55, 60,011–15. The Plant Protection Act 
defines noxious weed to include ‘any plant or plant product that can directly or indirectly 
injure or cause damage to crops ... or other interests of agriculture, irrigation, navigation, the 
natural resources of the United States, the public health, or the environment’: 7 USC § 
7702(10) (2006). Biological control organisms include ‘any enemy, antagonist, or competitor 
used to control a plant pest or noxious weed’: at § 7702(2). 
57 APHIS, 2008 Proposed Regulations, above n 55, 60,016–23. Review of notifications, even 
under current regulations, is similar to review of permit applications. APHIS proposed only 
minor changes to the permit process for interstate movement and import. 
58 Ibid 60,023–5, 60,047. Organisms already non-regulated will be approved automatically 
under the proposed new regulations. 
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low-level presence of regulated materials, designed to implement its 2007 
policy statement on remediation.59
C  EPA Regulation 
 
The EPA regulates GM plants that express pesticidal substances as pesticides 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).60 The 
Agency also regulates pesticide residues in foods under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).61 The EPA addresses food safety issues associated 
with pesticides, and the FDA addresses other food safety issues (for example, 
compositional changes in food).62
In 1994, the EPA issued a Policy Statement and Proposed Rules.
 
63 Though the 
Agency then started to regulate under FIFRA and the FDCA, it enacted its 
regulatory framework only in 2001, with rules that established criteria, 
procedures, and requirements under both FIFRA and the FDCA.64 In 2007, a 
new guidance document focused on small-scale field studies and low-level 
presence of GM pesticidal materials in food.65
                                                 
59 Ibid 60,025–26. See above text at nn 48–51. A proposed regulation would allow APHIS to 
exempt privileged or confidential business information from release under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 USCA § 552 (West 2007 & Supp 2009).   
 
60 7 USCA §§ 136–136y (West 1999 & Supp 2009). 
61 21 USCA § 346a (West 1999 & Supp 2009). At the time of the 1992 Policy Statement, 
pesticide residues were regulated as food additives. 
62 FDA, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed Reg 22,984, 
23,005 (29 May 1992) (‘FDA, 1992 Policy’). The FDA has authority for substances intended 
to enhance plant resistance to chemical herbicides, like glyphosate. Some instances, however, 
would require expertise of both the EPA and FDA, and questions of jurisdiction are to be 
raised with the EPA. 
63 EPA, Plant Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Proposed Rule, 59 Fed Reg 60,496 (23 
November 1994), to be codified at 40 CFR pts 152, 174, 180. The EPA published other 
proposals at 59 Fed Reg 60,519, 60,535, 60,542, and 60,545 (23 November 1994). 
64 EPA, Regulations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-
Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed Reg 37,772 (19 July 2001), 
codified at 40 CFR pts 152 and 174 (‘EPA, 2001 FIFRA Regulation’). 
65 EPA, Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 2007-2: Guidance on Small-Scale Field Testing and 
Low-Level Presence in Food of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (PIPs) (EPA Doc. EPA-HQ-
OPP-2007-0654-0001, 2007) <http://www.epa.gov/PR_Notices/pr2007-2.htm> at 24 March 
2009 (‘EPA, Notice 2007-2’). The guidance document set out policy established in FIFRA, 
FDCA, and EPA regulations. It does not bind the EPA or others, and the EPA can depart from 
the guidance: at 7. 
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1  Plant Incorporated Protectants (PIPs) – FIFRA 
Plant incorporated protectants (PIPs) fit within the FIFRA definition of 
pesticides because they are introduced into plants as a means of ‘preventing, 
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest’.66
No pesticide can be marketed and used in the United States until it has been 
registered.
 A common example of a PIP 
is the pesticide frequently used in GM crops, Bt (bacillus thuringiensis). 
67 A pesticide can be registered if the applicant can show that its 
composition warrants the registrant’s claims, its labelling complies with 
FIFRA and, when used in accordance with normal practice, it does not ‘cause 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment’.68
The EPA uses the FIFRA registration system to collect data on the safety, 
efficacy and environmental effects of PIPs.
 
69 Field tests of unregistered PIPs, 
authorised by experimental use permits, allow the developer to gather 
information for its own use and to support registration.70 If a field test is 
reasonably expected to result in a food residue, the EPA may establish a 
temporary food tolerance (a legal limit on the maximum amount of the 
substance in or on food) under the FDCA before issuing the permit.71 Some 
field tests ‘are presumed not to involve unreasonable adverse effects’72
                                                 
66 7 USC § 136(u) (2006). The EPA defines PIP as: ‘a pesticidal substance that is intended to be 
produced and used in a living plant, or in the produce thereof, and the genetic material 
necessary for production of such a pesticidal substance. It also includes any inert ingredient 
[such as selective markers used to ensure the active ingredient is inserted into the plant] 
contained in the plant, or produce thereof’: 40 CFR § 174.3 (2008). See EPA, Notice 2007-2, 
above n 65, 1. 
 and 
67 7 USCA § 136a (West 1999 & Supp 2009). Establishments where pesticides are produced 
must also be registered under FIFRA, § 136e. The EPA can exempt from regulation a 
pesticide that is regulated by another federal agency or ‘of a character which is unnecessary to 
be subject to’ FIFRA: § 136w(b). See also EPA, 2001 FIFRA Regulation, above n 64, 37,773 
(interpreting EPA authority to exempt pesticides). 
68 7 USCA § 136a(c)(5) (West 1999 & Supp 2009). See § 136(bb): ‘The term ‘unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment’ means (1) any unreasonable risk to man or the 
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits 
of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of 
a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard under section 346a of title 21.’ 
69 Data requirements are extensive and include product characteristics, mammalian toxicity, 
gene flow assessment, risk to non target organisms, environmental fate, and insect resistance. 
See generally EPA, Introduction to Biotechnology Regulation for Pesticides: Guidance 
Document (2007) 6-25 <www.epa.gov/oppbppd1/biopesticides/regtools/biotech-reg-
prod.htm> at 24 March 2009 (‘EPA, Intro to Biotech Regulation’). 
70 7 USC § 136c (2006); 40 CFR pt 172 (2008). In issuing permits, the EPA must determine 
that the experimental use will not result in ‘unreasonable adverse effects’ on human health or 
the environment: 7 USC § 136c(d) (2006); 40 CFR § 172.10(a) (2008). 
71 7 USC § 136c(b) (2006). 
72 40 CFR § 172.3(a) (2008). 
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therefore do not require a permit. Laboratory or greenhouse tests are 
presumed to be exempt. A small-scale test on a cumulative total of no more 
than ten acres of land per target pest does not require an experimental use 
permit, but any food or feed crops involved in the test must be destroyed or 
eaten by experimental animals unless the EPA has established a food 
tolerance (or exemption) for residues.73
The EPA encourages those conducting field trials to consult with the Agency 
to discuss confinement of the tested PIP. Physical or biological controls that 
comply with APHIS requirements will generally satisfy the EPA. As a result 
of the consultation, the EPA may recommend that the developer seek a 
temporary food tolerance, or the Agency may require an experimental use 
permit.
 
74
In April 2007, the EPA sought public comments on possible new regulations 
for PIPs, which are governed in part by general regulations that apply to all 
pesticides.
 
75 Because PIPs are produced and used in a living plant, they differ 
from pesticides intended for external physical application.76 EPA regulations 
that govern the registration of pesticide establishments and pesticide 
production are not completely appropriate for PIPs, which present unique 
regulatory issues.77 Therefore the EPA plans to codify new data requirements 
for pesticide registration of PIPs to reflect current scientific advances and to 
‘improve the Agency’s ability to make regulatory decisions about human 
health and environmental effects of PIP pesticides to better protect wildlife, 
the environment and people’.78
                                                 
73 40 CFR § 172.3(b),(c) (2008). The EPA requires notification and approval (or a permit) for a 
small scale test of certain microbial pesticides, including those ‘whose pesticidal properties 
have been imparted or enhanced by the introduction of genetic material that has been 
deliberately modified’: 40 CFR § 172.45(c)(1) (2008); EPA, Intro to Biotech Regulation, 
above n 69, 3–4. 
 
74 EPA, Notice 2007-2, above n 65, 2. 
75 EPA, Plant-Incorporated Protectants; Potential Revisions to Current Production 
Regulations, 72 Fed Reg 16,312 (4 April 2007). 
76 Ibid 16,312–13. The EPA believes that PIPs usually present lower risk than chemical 
pesticides. 
77 For example, regulations that require reporting of volume or weight of pesticides are 
inappropriate for PIPs in living plants: 40 CFR pt 167 (2008). 
78 EPA, Statement of Priorities, 72 Fed Reg 69,922, 69,939 (10 December 2007). The planned 
regulations, with no legal deadline but a May 2009 completion goal, will amend 40 CFR pts 
158 and 174. See also 72 Fed Reg 19,590 and 19,640 (18 April 2007). 
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2  Pesticide Residues – FDCA 
The FDCA governed pesticide residues in the same way as other food 
additives until the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act79 removed pesticide 
residues from the definition of food additives and from the controversial food 
additive Delaney Clause.80 The FDCA now provides that raw or processed 
food or feed that contains pesticide chemical residues is considered 
adulterated and cannot be moved in interstate commerce, unless the residue 
complies with an established tolerance or has been exempted from the 
tolerance requirement.81
The EPA sets pesticide tolerances for foods (or establishes an exemption), and 
the FDA enforces those pesticide tolerances. The EPA may establish a 
tolerance only if it is ‘safe’.
 Residues of PIPs in foods (including food produced 
during field tests) are subject to this requirement. 
82 The EPA may grant exemptions, either 
temporary or permanent, from the tolerance requirement if tests indicate that 
the pesticidal protein is neither toxic nor allergenic and there is ‘a reasonable 
certainty that no harm will result’ from aggregate exposure.83 Scientific data 
must support requests for tolerances or exemptions.84 By regulation, the EPA 
has granted both temporary and permanent exemptions to PIPs in GM crops, 
for example, various proteins associated with Bt crops.85
D  FDA – The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)86
                                                 
79 Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, 1513 (3 August 1996).  
 authorises the FDA to regulate 
the safety of food and feed, including non-pesticidal GM foods from new 
plant varieties. In regulating food safety, the FDA relies primarily on 
80 Delaney clauses prohibit FDA approval of substances that contain carcinogens. See 21 USC 
§§ 348(c)(3)(A) (food additives), 360b(d)(1)(H) (color additives), 379e(b)(5)(B) (animal 
drugs) (2006). See Les v Reilly, 968 F2d 985 (9th Cir 1992). 
81 21 USC § 346a(a)(1) (2006). See also EPA, Notice 2007-2, above n 65, 3. 
82 21 USC § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Safe means ‘a reasonable certainty that no harm will 
result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated 
dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable information’: at § 
346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).  
83 21 USC § 346a(c)(2)(A)(i),(ii) (2006). The risk to infants and children must be considered, 
but benefits from the use of the pesticide cannot be considered. 
84 EPA, Notice 2007-2, above n 65, 6–7. See 40 CFR § 174.507 (2008) (exempting residues of 
nucleic acids that are part of PIPs). 
85 See 40 CFR § 174.501–528 (2008) for exemptions. 
86 21 USC §§ 301–399 (West 1999 & Supp 2009). Meat and poultry products are regulated, in 
the main, by the USDA. 
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provisions that prohibit adulteration of food and govern food additives.87 The 
FDA insists that those who introduce a new food have legal responsibility to 
evaluate its safety and to ensure that it meets the requirements of the FDCA.88 
FDA policy for GM foods is influenced by the Agency’s belief that GM 
varieties and their food products ‘are as safe and nutritious as their traditional 
counterparts’.89
1  FDA Policy 
 
Because new plant varieties had been developed safely, the FDA did not 
routinely conduct pre-market safety reviews of new foods derived from 
plants. In its 1992 Policy Statement, the Agency adopted a similar approach to 
GM foods.90 The FDA expected most transferred genetic material to be safe, 
but genetic modification could cause changes – for example, in structure, 
function, or composition – that require evaluation to ensure food safety.91 If 
necessary to protect public health, the FDA has authority to require premarket 
review and approval of new foods.92
The FDA indicated that it would focus on the food product, rather than the 
process by which the food was produced: 
 
The regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by which it is 
developed, is dependent upon objective characteristics of the food and the 
                                                 
87 21 USC §§ 342, 348 (2006). 
88 See FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,990. 
89 Keith T Atherton, ‘Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops’ (2002) 181–82 
Toxicology 421, 421. 
90 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,988. Section VII of the policy document focuses on 
scientific conditions and includes flow charts to help producers decide if a new food presents 
no safety concerns, is an unacceptable new variety, or if the FDA should be consulted. 
91 These include unexpected effects (for example, introduction of undesirable traits), higher 
levels of toxicants than in other varieties of the same species, alteration in nutrient levels, 
introduction of new substances (proteins, carbohydrates, fats, oils) that differ significantly in 
composition, allergenicity, presence of antibiotic resistance markers, production of non-food 
chemicals (for example, pharmaceuticals) in new plants: FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 
22,986–88. Animal feeds raise particular issues, because a single food type may make up a 
majority of animals’ diets and because animals consume parts of plants that humans do not 
eat: at 22,988. 
92 Ibid 22,988–90, citing 21 USC § 342(a)(1) (2006) as the source of authority. The Flavr Savr 
tomato (FDA Docket No 91A-0330, developed by Calgene, Inc) was the first genetically 
engineered food reviewed by the FDA. At Calgene’s request, the FDA reviewed the Flavr 
Savr tomato stringently to determine whether it was as safe as other tomatoes; the agency 
concluded that no significant safety differences existed. See FDA, Calgene, Inc; Availability 
of Letter Concluding Consultation, 59 Fed Reg 26,647 (23 May 1994). The EPA also 
approved the tomato’s marker gene, which was not generally recognised as safe, as a food 
additive: at 26,700. 
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intended use of the food (or its components). … [K]ey factors in reviewing 
safety concerns should be the characteristics of the food product, rather than 
the fact that the new methods are used.93
Therefore the FDA relied on its existing regulatory regime to ensure the safety 
of foods and food ingredients from new plant varieties.  
 
The FDA’s Policy Statement indicated that its approach was ‘consistent with 
the concepts of substantial equivalence of new foods’ articulated by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and principles for 
assessment of food safety established by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the World Health Organization.94 Substantial equivalence is 
‘an internationally recognized standard that measures whether a biotech food 
or crop shares similar health and nutritional characteristics with its 
conventional counterpart’.95 It is not a safety assessment, but involves a 
‘comparative approach and embodies the idea that existing traditionally 
produced foods can serve as a reference to evaluate the safety of genetically 
modified foods’.96 That is, if a GM food product and its conventional 
counterpart do not differ in nutritional (or anti-nutritional) components, the 
GM product is considered to be substantially equivalent.97 The FDA subjects 
to premarket review only foods that lack substantial equivalence – that is, 
foods with characteristics that carry higher risk (for example, toxin levels or a 
new substance).98
The FDA proposed, but may never implement, a requirement that it receive 
notice at least 120 days before commercial distribution of most bioengineered 
foods, including those derived from new GM plants with pesticidal 
 
                                                 
93 FDA, 1992 Policy above n 62, 22,984–85. A National Academy of Sciences report agrees 
with the FDA: a ‘policy to assess products based exclusively on their method of breeding is 
scientifically unjustified’ – NAS, Safety of Genetically Engineered Foods: Approaches to 
Assessing Unintended Health Effects (2004) 9. 
94 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,992 (referring to OECD and FAO/WHO documents). 
95 Council for Biotechnology Information, Substantial Equivalence in Food Safety Assessment 
(2001) 1 <http://www.whybiotech.com/html/pdf/Substantial_Equivalence.pdf> at 25 March 
2009. 
96 H A Kuiper et al, ‘Substantial Equivalence – an Appropriate Paradigm for the Safety 
Assessment of Genetically Modified Foods?’ (2002) 181–82 Toxicology 427, 427. 
97 Council for Biotechnology Information, above n 95, 1. One scholar asserted that the FDA’s 
use of substantial equivalence in the 1992 Policy Statement ‘shifted the burden of proof back 
to the government for the vast majority of GM foods’: Thomas O McGarity, ‘Seeds of 
Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods’ (2002) 35 University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 403, 484. 
98 In analysing gene products, the first step is evaluation for allergenicity, acute toxicities, and 
major ‘compositional components’. The second step, if the protein is safe, focuses on 
substantial equivalence: Council for Biotechnology Information, above n 95, 1. 
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substances. This measure would allow the FDA to ensure that plant-derived 
bioengineered foods comply with the FDCA, particularly in situations where 
unintended changes in foods might raise questions of harm to health or 
misbranding. Because most modifications would not raise such questions, the 
FDA did not plan to require premarket approval for all GM foods or to require 
special labels.99 At the same time, the FDA published a Draft Guidance on 
voluntary labelling,100
2  Guidance Documents 
 which has not been finalised. 
The FDA often communicates with its own staff, industry, and the public 
through guidance documents. These documents, less formal than regulations, 
reflect the Agency’s current thinking, but do not legally bind the FDA or the 
public.101
The FDA’s 1992 Policy Statement indicated that ‘prudent’ developers of 
foods using new technologies, including new plant varieties, would consult 
with the FDA before commercial distribution of foods or feed from new plant 
varieties.
  
102 In 1997, therefore, the FDA published a ‘Guidance on 
Consultation Procedures’ for industry, listing information (including safety 
and nutritional assessments) that should be submitted to the FDA and 
describing the procedure for consultation.103 The FDA recommended initial 
biotechnology consultations on new plant varieties prior to commercialisation, 
other consultations as necessary, and a final consultation once the developer 
has documentation – including detailed safety and nutritional assessments – to 
show that its new product is safe. FDA scientists review the data to identify 
unresolved scientific and regulatory issues.104
                                                 
99 FDA, Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed Reg 4706, 4711 (18 
January 2001), to be codified at 21 CFR pts 192 and 592. Because consultation is successful 
and protects public health, the FDA indicated that the rule may not be needed: GAO, GE 
Crops, above n 22, 44. 
 Biotechnology consultation is 
100 CFSAN, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have 
or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering (Draft, Jan 2001) 
<http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments
/FoodLabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm> at 26 October 2009. (‘FDA, Draft Guidance: 
Voluntary Labeling’). 
101 See Erica Seiguer and John J Smith, ‘Perception and Process at the Food and Drug 
Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances’ (2005) 60 Food and 
Drug Law Journal 17, 20. 
102 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,991. 
103 CFSAN, FDA, Guidance on Consultation Procedures – Food Derived from New Plant 
Varieties (October 1997) <http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm> at 26 October 2009 
(‘FDA, 1997 Consultation’).  
104 Ibid pt II. 
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voluntary, but food companies do follow the practice,105
In 2006, the FDA issued another guidance document, which recommended 
early food safety evaluation of certain new GM food varieties.
 perhaps in part to 
avoid liability triggered by unsafe foods. 
106 Recognising 
the likelihood of cross-pollination from field tests and commingling of seeds, 
the FDA addressed the possibility of ‘inadvertent, intermittent, low-level 
presence in the food supply of proteins that have not been evaluated through 
the FDA’s voluntary consultation process’.107 Questions about the safety of a 
new protein should be resolved before the developer carries out any activity 
that could result in the protein entering the food supply. The guidance 
document therefore encourages developers to submit food safety data about 
new proteins early (perhaps at the time of field tests), before those new 
proteins enter the food supply via pollen flow or commingling.108 Early food 
safety evaluation precedes the biotechnology consultation, which occurs when 
developers plan to commercialise new plant varieties. Developers can use data 
from the food safety evaluation in the later consultation.109
E  FDA Regulation 
 
1  Food Additives 
The FDA governs GM food under its authority to regulate food additives. 
Under the FDCA, a food is adulterated if it bears or contains an added 
‘poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health’, 
                                                 
105 See Larry Thompson, ‘Are Bioengineered Foods Safe?’ (2000) 34(1) FDA Consumer 
Magazine (Jan–Feb) 18. 
106 CFSAN, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Recommendations for the Early Food Safety 
Evaluation of New Non-Pesticidal Proteins Produced by New Plant Varieties Intended for 
Food Use (June 2006) <http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology/ucm096156.htm> at 26 October 2009 
(‘FDA, 2006 Guidance’). The GAO recommended that the EPA post results of these 
evaluations on its website and that, at an early stage, the FDA and USDA share information 
about GM crops that might raise health concerns or cause financial losses: GAO, GE Crops, 
above n 22, 46. 
107 FDA, 2006 Guidance, above n 106, 3. In the 10 years prior to 2006, the FDA had reviewed 
over 60 bioengineered food products, which were deemed as safe as conventional 
counterparts. Robert E Brackett, ‘Testimony on The Regulation of Dietary Supplements: A 
Review of Consumer Safeguards’ (Committee on Government Reform, US House of 
Representatives, 9 March 2006) <www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t060309.html> at 25 March 2009. 
108 FDA, 2006 Guidance, above n 106, 4–5. PIPs, of course, are regulated by the EPA. 
109 Ibid 6 (III.C.3.). For a recent practical application, see CFSAN, Office of Food Additive 
Safety, U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Statement on LLRICE 600 Series (March 2007) 
<http://www.fda.gov/Food/Biotechnology/Announcements/ucm109406.htm > at 26 October 
2009. 
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an unsafe pesticide residue, or an unsafe additive.110 A food additive is 
considered unsafe unless it has been granted premarket approval or is exempt 
from approval.111 To gain approval of a new food additive, the manufacturer 
submits a food additive petition, accompanied by studies to prove the safety 
of the additive. Approval requires that the FDA be convinced that the 
proposed use of the additive is safe,112 with ‘a reasonable certainty ... that the 
substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use’.113 If the FDA 
finds the additive safe, it will issue a regulation to that effect; otherwise 
additives are considered unsafe and therefore the food is adulterated.114
Most non-pesticidal GM foods escape rigorous premarket review as food 
additives under the GRAS concept.
 
115 The FDCA definition of food 
additive116 excludes substances ‘generally recognised as safe’ (GRAS).117 
Substances that are GRAS – including many ingredients from natural sources 
and some chemical additives – are not food additives and are therefore exempt 
from regulation as food additives.118
                                                 
110 21 USC § 342(a) (2006) (defining adulterated food). Any substance that is not ‘an inherent 
constituent of food or whose level in food has been increased by human intervention’ is 
‘added’ under 21 USC § 342(a)(1) (2006). FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,989. 
 The determination that a substance is 
111 21 USC § 348(a) (2006). The Food Additives Amendment, enacted in 1958, did not address 
foods from new plant varieties, which had been regulated under 21 USC § 342(a)(1) (2006). 
112 21 USC § 348(b),(c) (2006). See § 321(u): ‘The term "safe" ... has reference to the health of 
man or animal.’ 
113 21 CFR § 170.3(i) (2009). 
114 Unapproved additives are considered adulterated under 21 USC § 342(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
115 On GRAS, see Fred H Degnan, ‘The GRAS Concept: Ensuring Food Safety and Fostering 
Innovation’ (‘GRAS Concept’) in Fred H Degnan, FDA’s Creative Application of the Law: 
Not Merely a Collection of Words (2006) 15–35. Degnan referred to Congress’ enactment of 
GRAS as ‘a display of practical judgment’: at 15. The FDA has applied different 
interpretations to the GRAS provisions, but most recently GRAS is considered, as in the 
earliest interpretation, ‘as a tool capable of more flexibility, thus permitting realistic food 
safety decisions and fostering new technology and innovation’: at 15. 
116 A food additive is defined as a substance that is ‘not generally recognized, among experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been 
adequately shown through scientific procedures ... to be safe under the conditions of its 
intended use ... .’ 21 USC § 321(s) (2006). 
117 The regulatory definition of GRAS, 21 CFR § 170.30 (2009), reads in part: ‘(a) General 
recognition of safety may be based only on the views of experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the safety of substances directly or indirectly added to 
food. … General recognition of safety requires common knowledge about the substance 
throughout the scientific community knowledgeable about the safety of substances directly or 
indirectly added to food.’ 
118 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,989. In 1958, the FDA published the GRAS list of 
substances in its regulations, with the current list in 21 CFR pts 182 and 184 and 186 (2009). 
Paulette M Gaynor et al, FDA’s Approach to the GRAS Provision: A History of Process 
(2006) <http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/GenerallyRecognizedasSafe 
GRAS/ucm094040.htm> at 26 October 2009. 
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GRAS, however, requires ‘the same quantity and quality of scientific 
evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food additive regulation for the 
ingredient’.119
The FDA concluded in 1992 that most GM foods will be considered GRAS 
because most new plant foods had been accepted widely as safe.
 
120 The use of 
the GRAS concept for foods produced through biotechnology lets the Agency 
‘take advantage of the dual purposes of the [Food Additives Amendment] – 
ensuring safety and fostering innovation by relying on the use of sound 
scientific judgment based on good science’.121 A lawsuit challenged the 
FDA’s 1992 policy and its determination that most GM foods will be GRAS. 
Holding that the FDA’s presumption of GRAS status for GM foods was not 
arbitrary and capricious, the court noted that the GRAS determination must be 
based on technical evidence of safety, which is generally known and accepted 
in the scientific community. The court deferred to the FDA’s evaluation of 
scientific data within its area of expertise.122
The FDCA does not require the FDA to be informed about the additions of 
substances that manufacturers consider to be GRAS.
 
123 The FDA uses a 
notification procedure outlined in a 1997 regulatory proposal, which has not 
yet been promulgated.124 Under that procedure, any person can notify the 
FDA of a claim that a particular use of a substance is exempt from premarket 
approval as GRAS. The FDA responds to GRAS notices, but an FDA 
response does not constitute approval.125
                                                 
119 21 CFR § 170.30(b) (2009). See Degnan, ‘GRAS Concept’, above n 115, 26–8 (reviewing 
litigation on the standard for GRAS determination). 
 This means that companies 
themselves must decide whether a new food substance is GRAS or whether it 
is a food additive that requires FDA approval. 
120 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,990. The agency did not expect ‘any serious question 
about the GRAS status of transferred genetic material’, unless the substance (for example, 
protein, carbohydrate, fat, oil) differed ‘significantly in structure, function, or composition 
from substances found currently in food’. 
121 Degnan, ‘GRAS Concept’, above n 115, 30. 
122 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v Shalala, 116 F Supp 2d 166, 177 (D DC 2000), citing 21 CFR § 
170.30(a), (b). 
123 See 21 USC § 348 (2006) and McGarity, above n 97, 455. A 1972 regulation (not yet 
repealed) allowed manufacturers to petition the FDA for affirmation of the GRAS status of 
new substances: 21 CFR § 170.35 (2009). 
124 FDA, Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed Reg 18,938 (17 April 1997). 
125 See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Frequently Asked Questions about GRAS (2004) Q 15 
<http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments
/FoodIngredientsandPackaging/ucm061846.htm> at 26 October 2009. Between 1997 and 
February 2006, 193 GRAS Notices had been filed. Gaynor et al, above n 118. 
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2  Labelling 
The FDA does not require labels for most GM foods.126 The FDCA defines a 
food as ‘misbranded’ if ‘its labeling is false or misleading in any 
particular’.127 A factor in determining whether a label is misleading is ‘the 
extent to which the labeling ... fails to reveal [material] facts ...’.128 The FDA 
has interpreted the term ‘material’ to refer to attributes of the food product 
and has required special labels only when the absence of information could 
pose health or environmental risks, mislead the consumer, or allow the 
consumer to believe, wrongly, that one food has nutritional, functional, or 
other characteristics similar to another food.129
The FDA did not consider the methods used to develop new plant varieties to 
be material information under the FDCA, and the development of GM foods 
did not change the Agency’s opinion.
 
130
not aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new 
methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, 
as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or 
greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.
 Moreover, the FDA was 
131
Therefore, GM products need not be identified as GM unless the food itself 
differs significantly from similar foods – for example, in its nutritional content 
or the presence of an allergen.
 
132 In a case that challenged the FDA’s 
interpretation of ‘material’, the court upheld the FDA’s determination that 
genetic modification is not a material fact that requires labelling.133
                                                 
126 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,991. 
 
127 21 USC § 343(a) (2006). 
128 21 USC § 321(n) (2006). 
129 Brackett, above n 107, 5. So, for example, if a tomato had an inserted peanut protein that 
might cause an allergic reaction, the presence of that protein would be a ‘material fact’, and 
its omission would make the label misleading. See 21 USC § 343(a),(w) (2006); FDA, 1992 
Policy, above n 62, 22,991. 
130 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,991. The FDA believes that it has ‘neither a scientific nor 
a legal basis to require such labeling’: Brackett, above n 107, 5. 
131 FDA, 1992 Policy, above n 62, 22,991.  
132 See Brackett, above n 107, 5. For example, a GM soybean variety had altered levels of oleic 
acid, resulting in soybean oil that differed from conventional soybean oil. The FDA advised 
that the oil be given a new name that reflected the difference. 
133 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v Shalala, 116 F Supp 2d 166, 179 (D DC 2000). Because the 
FDA had determined that genetic modification does not alter foods materially, a 
determination to which the court granted deference, it lacked a legal basis for requiring labels, 
even in the face of consumer demand. See generally Fred H Degnan, ‘Biotechnology and the 
Food Label’ in Paul Weirich (ed), Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical 
and Legal Debate (2007) 17–31. 
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Because consumers may be interested in whether food has been genetically 
modified, however, the FDA published a Draft Guidance to help industry 
ensure that voluntary labelling is truthful and does not mislead consumers. 
The document gives examples of statements that could be used on food labels 
without causing the label to be misleading and the food therefore 
misbranded.134
III  EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATION OF GM CROPS 
 
A number of genetically modified organisms135 and their food and feed 
products have been approved for consumption or processing in the European 
Union. About 27 varieties are approved for food, feed, and other purposes. 
GMOs approved for consumption are listed in the Community Register of 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed.136 Only GM maize is approved for 
cultivation,137 however, and since 1998 no new product has been approved for 
cultivation, though a number await approval. New crop varieties may not be 
sold and planted in Member States until they are listed in the EU Common 
Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species.138 The Commission 
added 17 varieties of corn, derived from Monsanto’s MON810 maize and 
authorised in 1998, to the list in 2004.139
                                                 
134 FDA, Draft Guidance: Voluntary Labeling, above n 100, 3 and 4–6. The Guidance, which 
reaffirmed the FDA’s decision not to require labels for all GM food, remains in draft form. 
 Only varieties derived from 
MON810 and Syngenta’s Bt176 were cultivated commercially in the 
European Union, but, in April 2007, the Commission withdrew Bt176 and its 
135 For more detail on EC regulatory measures see Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘Traceability and 
Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed in the European Union’ (2005) 1 
Journal of Food Law and Policy 43, 53–71. 
136 See DG Health and Consumer Protection, European Commission, Community Register of 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed <http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_ 
en.cfm> at 13 November 2009 (listing 27 authorised varieties of cotton, maize, micro-
organisms, oilseed rape, soybeans, and sugar beet). 
137 For current information, see GMO Compass, GMO Database <http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/gmo/db/> at 26 March 2009. Many of the GM corn events approved in the 
US are not approved in the EU. 
138 The Common Catalogue is governed by Council Directive (EC) 2002/53 [2002] OJ L193/1, 
as amended. See Common Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/propagation/catalogues/comcat_agri_2008/index_en.htm> at 
27 March 2009. 
139 European Commission, 'Inscription of MON 810 GM maize varieties in the Common EU 
Catalogue of Varieties’ (Press Release IP/04/1083, 8 September 2004). 
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products from the market.140
A complex and interrelated system of Directives and Regulations, designed to 
ensure that authorised GMOs do not threaten health or the environment, 
governs GMOs and their food and feed products. In 1990, the European 
Community introduced a process-based regulatory system that requires case-
by-case authorisation of GMOs and follows a step-by-step process of 
decreasing containment. Later amendments and new measures strengthened 
the regulatory system, adding requirements for traceability and labelling, with 
thresholds for applicability to ensure that producers and consumers enjoy 
freedom of choice between GM and other crops. Nonetheless, the process of 
authorisation, interrupted by a lengthy (1998–2004) moratorium, has moved 
slowly, and suspicion about GM crops and their products remains. 
 Moreover, MON810 has engendered controversy 
and several Member States have banned its cultivation. 
EC Directives govern the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms141 and the deliberate release of GMOs.142 EC Regulations govern 
GM food and feed143 and the traceability and labelling of GMOs and food and 
feed products produced from GMOs.144
                                                 
140 Syngenta had stopped selling seeds after 2005 and did not plan to seek renewal of its 
authorisation. Commission Decision (EC) 2007/304 on the Withdrawal from the Market of 
Bt176 (SYN-EV176-9) Maize and its Derived Products [2007] OJ L117/4. Adventitious or 
technically unavoidable presence of Bt176, in a proportion no higher than 0.9 percent, will be 
tolerated for five years. 
 In addition to measures that govern 
141 Council Directive 90/219 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms 
[1990] OJ L 117/1, as amended, now recast as Parliament and Council Directive 2009/41 on 
the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms [2009] OJ L 125/75. The first 
Directive on deliberate release was Council Directive 90/220 [1990] OJ L 117/15 (repealed in 
2002). 
142 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment 
of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220 [2001] OJ L 
106/1, as amended. Consolidated text: CONSLEG 2001L0018-21.03.2008.  
143 Parliament and Council Regulation 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Fee 
[2003] OJ L 268/1, as amended. Consolidated text: CONSLEG 2003R1829-10.04.2008. 
144 Parliament and Council Regulation 1830/2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling 
of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products 
Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18 [2003] OJ 
L 268/24, as amended. CONSLEG 2003R1830-11.12.2008. Article 43 amends Directive 
2001/18. 
The last two Regulations replace several earlier measures, including Council Regulation 
1139/98 [1998] OJ L 159/4 (labelling of food produced from GMOs); Commission Regulation 
49/2000 [2000] OJ L 6/13 (amending Regulation 1139/98); Commission Regulation 50/2000 
[2000] OJ L 6/15 (labelling for GM additives and flavourings). They also replace the Novel 
Foods Regulation, Parliament and Council Regulation 258/97 [1997] OJ L 43/1, which had 
governed pre-market authorisation and labelling for GM foods, insofar as it applied to GMOs, 
but parts of that Regulation remain in effect. 
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GMOs and their products, the General Food Law145
A  Contained Use and Deliberate Release 
 sets out general principles 
and establishes the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which plays an 
important role in authorising GM food and feed. 
Directive 2009/41, enacted in 2009 to replace Directive 90/219, governs the 
contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs). ‘Contained 
use’ involves activities in which micro-organisms are genetically modified or 
in which GMMs are used and for which ‘specific containment measures’ 
protect the general public and the environment.146 The Directive thus governs 
research, laboratory, and industrial work with GMMs. Member States 
implement the Directive through designated competent authorities that inspect 
and carry out other control measures. Users determine the level of risk and the 
containment level required to avoid adverse effects on health and 
environment.147 Users must apply the appropriate containment and other 
protective measures and notify Member State authorities of activities 
conducted on their premises.148 Member States inform the Commission 
annually about their activities, with a summary every three years, and report 
relevant incidents (for example, accidents) to the Commission and other 
Member States.149
After a decade of experience with an earlier Directive,
 
150 the European 
Community enacted Directive 2001/18 on deliberate release of GMOs, 
designed to make the authorisation of GMOs more efficient and transparent 
and to control possible risks to human health and the environment.151
                                                 
145 Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General 
Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority 
and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety [2002] OJ L 31/1, as amended. 
Consolidated text: CONSLEG 2002R0178-25.03.2008. 
 This 
Directive imposed more stringent measures for environmental risk 
assessment, required post-market monitoring, limited authorisation of GMOs 
to 10 years, and required Member States to ensure traceability and labelling of 
146 Directive 2009/41, art 2(c). 
147 Directive 2009/41, arts 4 and 5. Moderate or high risk contained use of GMMs requires 
prior written consent of the competent authority: art 9. 
148 Directive 2009/41, arts 6–11. 
149 Annexes to Directive 2009/41 describe techniques of genetic modification (Annex I); 
excluded techniques and safety criteria (Annex II); principles to be applied in the risk 
assessment (Annex III); measures required for various types of containment – laboratories, 
growing rooms, animal units, other activities (Annex IV); and information required for 
notifications required by the Directive (Annex V). 
150 Council Directive 90/220 [1990] OJ L 117/15, as amended (repealed 2002). 
151 Directive 2001/18, preamble (5), (48) [2001] OJ L 106/1, 3. 
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GMOs at all stages.152 A number of other regulatory measures supplement 
Directive 2001/18.153
Directive 2001/18 defines a GMO as ‘an organism, with the exception of 
human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that 
does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’.
 
154 General 
provisions – for example, confidentiality and consultation requirements – 
apply to all GMOs.155 Moreover, anyone who plans to seek authorisation to 
release a GMO must carry out an environmental risk assessment, which 
evaluates potential adverse effects of the release on human health and the 
environment using principles for risk assessment set out in the Directive.156
Directive 2001/18 implements a step-by-step principle: 
 
[t]he containment of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release increased 
gradually, step by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier steps in terms of 
protection of human health and the environment indicates that the next step 
can be taken.157
The Directive therefore governs the deliberate release of GMOs in two steps: 
first for ‘any other purpose than for placing on the market’ (for example, field 
tests) and then for ‘placing on the market of GMOs as or in products’ (that is, 
the sale of GMOs or their products).
  
158
Deliberate release at the research stage is one of the steps preliminary to 
marketing, because GMOs must be field tested in appropriate ecosystems. 
Member States, through their competent authorities, authorise releases for 
field testing or other research under the procedure and time frames specified 
 
                                                 
152 Member States were to have implemented Directive 2001/18 in their national laws by 17 
October 2002. Directive 2001/18, art 34. Not all States did so, however. See Commission v 
French Republic (C-121/07), linked from <http://curia.europa.eu> at 16 April 2009 (fining 
France EUR 10 million for failure to implement the Directive). 
153 These include detailed guidance notes (for example, Council Decision 2002/811 [2002] OJ 
L 280/27; Commission Decision 2002/263 [2002] OJ L 200/22), format instructions for 
submitting information (for example, Council Decision 2002/812 [2002] OJ L 280/37; 
Council Decision 2002/813 [2002] OJ L 280/62; Commission Decision 2003/701 [2003] OJ L 
254/21), and arrangements for GMO registers (for example, Commission Decision 2004/204 
[2004] OJ L 65/20). 
154 Directive 2001/18, art 2(2), 2001 OJ L 106. 
155 Directive 2001/18, art 3. 
156 Directive 2001/18, art 6; Annex III. The Directive identifies the types of information that 
might be needed to carry out the risk assessment for higher plants and other organisms. Annex 
II, 19–22. 
157 Directive 2001/18, preamble (24). 
158 Directive 2001/18, pt B and pt C. 
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in the Directive.159 No release is permitted without written consent from the 
competent authority. After the release, the notifier reports results, especially 
concerning risk to health or the environment, to the competent authority.160
Member States must establish registers to record the location of releases for 
field tests and for releases of GMOs that have been approved and placed on 
the market.
 
161 Registration of the use of approved GMOs is intended, in part, 
to facilitate monitoring of their effect on the environment. The locations of 
releases and environmental risk assessments are to be made known to the 
public.162 In February 2009, the European Court of Justice held that the public 
may request all information relating to the locations of releases submitted to 
the competent authority in the Member State. It also held that such 
information may not be withheld under an exception to disclosure relating to 
protection of the public order.163
B  Placing GMOs on the Market 
 
An authorised GMO may be used ‘without further notification throughout the 
community’, and Member States may not ‘prohibit, restrict or impede the 
placing on the market of [authorised] GMOs, as or in products’.164 Therefore 
the process of placing GMOs and their products on the market is more 
complicated than authorisation of experimental releases and involves the 
Commission, EFSA, and the competent authorities of all Member States.165
                                                 
159 These steps include notification to the Member State competent authority, with a detailed 
technical dossier and environmental risk assessment: Directive 2001/18, art 6 and Annex III. 
The Commission receives a summary of each notification and forwards it to other Member 
States: at art 11. If appropriate, Member States may consult the public: at art 9(1). 
 
Directive 2001/18 governs the placement of GMOs on the market, and 
Regulation 1829/2003 governs GM food and feed. The process of 
authorisation helps to ensure that GMOs or their products do not pose risks to 
health or the environment. 
160 Directive 2001/18, art 10. Member States must make available to the public information on 
all releases in their territory, but without disclosing confidential information: at arts 9(2) and 
25. 
161 Directive 2001/18, art 31(3)(a), (b). 
162 Directive 2001/18, art 31(3)(b). Decision 2004/204 [2004] OJ L 65/20, sets forth detailed 
guidance for publicly accessible registers in Member States. To protect commercial interests, 
two sets of data should be maintained, one accessible to the public and the other accessible 
only to Member States, the Commission, and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
163 Commune de Sausheim v Azelvandre, C-552/07 linked from <http://curia.europa.eu> at 19 
February 2009. 
164 Directive 2001/18, art 19(1); art 22 (without prejudice to the safeguard clause in art 23). 
165 Moreover, products containing or consisting of GMOs cannot be imported into the EC if 
they do not comply with EC requirements: Directive 2001/18 preamble (11). 
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1  GMOs – Directive 2001/18 
Authorisation begins with notification to the Member State competent 
authority, with information about the GMO, an environmental risk 
assessment, a plan for post-release monitoring,166 conditions for use and 
handling of the product, a summary of the dossier, and other information.167 
If, after examining the notification for compliance with the Directive and 
preparing an assessment report, the Member State authority concludes that the 
GMO should be placed on the market, the authority sends the dossier 
summary, along with its assessment report, to the Commission and to the 
competent authorities of the other Member States.168 States may ask for 
information, make comments, or present ‘reasoned objections’.169 If no 
objections are made, or if issues are resolved, the competent authority may 
give written consent to the notifier.170 Written consent must include specific 
conditions for use, handling and packaging of the GMO or for protection of 
the environment, labelling requirements, and obligations for monitoring.171 
Written consent is given for a maximum of 10 years and can be renewed.172
If the Commission or a Member State raises and maintains an objection to 
consent – the situation for most GMOs so far – the Commission must consult 
the competent Scientific Committee, EFSA’s Scientific Panel on GMOs.
 
173
                                                 
166 Directive 2001/18, Annex VI; Decision 2002/811, Annex [2002] OJ L 280/27. The post-
release monitoring plan is important to ensure that assumptions underlying the environmental 
risk assessment were correct and to identify unanticipated adverse effects on human health or 
the environment. 
 If 
the scientific decision is favourable, the Commission will follow the 
Community inter-agency regulatory procedure, the so-called comitology 
procedure, to reach a decision. Commission consent has authorised GMOs 
under a comitology procedure since 2004, but a 2006 amendment adds a 
167 Directive 2001/18, art 13. 
168 Directive 2001/18, art 14. The Commission makes information available to the public: art 
24(1). If the competent authority rejects the notification, the procedure differs slightly: art 14. 
169 Directive 2001/18, art 15(1). 
170 Directive 2001/18, art 15(3). In a case brought under Directive 90/220, the European Court 
of Justice held that when no objections are raised, the competent authority is obliged to give 
consent: Ass’n Greenpeace France v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche (C-6/99) 
[2000] ECR I-6031. 
171 Directive 2001/18, art 19(3) [2001] OJ L 106/12. After consent, notifiers must follow the 
prescribed monitoring plan and report regularly to the Commission and competent authorities; 
results of monitoring are also available to the public: art 20. 
172 Directive 2001/18, arts 15(4) and 17. 
173 Directive 2001/18, art 28. 
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‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’.174 Under this more complicated 
procedure, which applies to GMOs, either Council or Parliament can block 
adoption of a draft measure.175
Even after consent is granted, a safeguard clause protects Member States. This 
clause allows a Member State provisionally to restrict or prohibit use or sale 
of a GMO or a GM product in its territory if the State has new information to 
demonstrate that the GMO poses a risk to human health or the environment.
 
176 
The Member State informs the Commission and other Member States; the 
Commission, with assistance of the Scientific Committee, decides whether the 
Member State’s action is justified. A number of Member States have invoked 
the safeguard clause in attempts to ban GMOs in their territories.177 Most 
recently, in April 2009, the German agriculture minister banned sale and 
cultivation of MON810 maize.178 Member States have not been forced to 
overturn their bans. In March 2009, for example, the Council rejected 
Commission proposals to lift national safeguards in Hungary and Austria.179
Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty offers an additional safeguard. After adoption 
of a Council or Commission harmonisation measure, Member States may 
 
                                                 
174 Directive 2001/18, arts 18 and 30(2). The comitology procedure is set out in Council 
Decision 1999/468, art 5 [1999] OJ L 184/23, as amended by Council Decision 2006/512 
[2006] OJ L 200/11. 
175 The Commission submits a draft of the measure to be taken (that is, a legislative decision to 
give consent to placing the GMO on the market) to a regulatory committee made up of 
Member State representatives. If the regulatory committee agrees, the Commission submits 
the draft measure to the European Parliament and Council for scrutiny. If neither body 
opposes the draft measures, the Commission adopts the measure, but if either body opposes 
the draft, the Commission may not adopt the measure. If the regulatory committee disagrees 
or gives no opinion on the Commission draft, the Commission submits the draft to the 
Council. If the Council opposes the measure, it will not be adopted. If the Council wants to 
adopt the measure, it is submitted to the Parliament, which may oppose (and thereby block) 
the measure. Council Decision 1999/468, art 5a, added by Council Decision 2006/512 [2006] 
OJ L 200/11. 
176 Directive 2001/18, art 23. The State’s belief must be based on information made available 
since the date of consent or on a reassessment of existing information using new scientific 
information. 
177 Six Member States invoked the safeguard clause (Directive 90/220, art 16) in 9 applications. 
In each instance, no justification for the State ban was found, but the Council has not acted to 
lift the bans. Commission, Questions and Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the 
European Union (Memo/07/117, 26 March 2007) 6–7. 
178 BBC News, ‘Germany Bans Monsanto’s GM Maize’ (14 April 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7998181.stm> at 14 October 2009. Monsanto sued, but in early 
May 2009, a German court denied an injunction against the ban. Verwaltungsgericht 
Braunschweig, ‘Genmais bleibt verboten’ (Press Release, 5 May 2009) 
<http://www.verwaltungsgericht-braunschweig.niedersachsen.de> at 12 May 2009. 
179 Council, ‘2928th Council Meeting: Environment, Brussels’ (Press Release 7042/09, 2 
March 2009) 8–9. 
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introduce national provisions ‘based on new scientific evidence relating to the 
protection of the environment ... on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure’.180 The 
Commission must determine whether the Member State provisions 
discriminate or restrict trade and whether they interfere with the internal 
market.181 Relying on this Treaty provision, Austria proposed to ban 
cultivation of approved GMOs in Upper Austria, justifying its measure as a 
means to protect traditional and organic production systems, nature, the 
environment and biodiversity. Its proposed ban was rejected, both by the 
Commission and in subsequent litigation.182
2  Food and Feed – Regulation 1829/2003 
 
To protect the health of humans and animals, Regulation 1829/2003 governs 
GM food and feed.183 Relying on principles articulated in Directive 2001/18, 
it uses the framework for risk assessment set out in the General Food Law. 
EFSA administers Regulation 1829/2003 and, with assistance from Member 
State agencies, assesses the risks of GM food or feed.184 The Scientific Panel 
on GMOs plays a major role.185 Under the ‘one door-one key’ principle, a 
single application may cover a GMO and food or feed containing or 
consisting of that GMO.186
                                                 
180 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art 95(5) [2002] OJ C 325/33 (consolidated 
version) (‘EC Treaty’). Article 95(4) includes an analogous provision for existing Member 
State measures. 
 Separate, but similar, measures govern GM food 
181 EC Treaty, art 95(5), (6). 
182 To evaluate the scientific justification for the proposed Austrian ban, the Commission asked 
the advice of EFSA, which consulted the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified 
Organisms. EFSA concluded that Austria’s justification did not meet the requirements of EC 
Treaty art 95(5), because Austria did not provide new scientific evidence related to protection 
of the environment, prove that its concerns about the coexistence of organic and GM crops 
were environmental, or show that Upper Austria had unique ecosystems. The Commission 
therefore rejected Austria’s proposed national provisions. Commission Decision 2003/653 
[2003] OJ L 230/34, 36. Litigation followed. The Court of First Instance found the bans 
illegal. Land Oberösterreich v Commission (T-366/03 and T-234/04) [2005] ECR II-4005. In 
September 2007, the European Court of Justice agreed that the bans were illegal. Joined 
Cases, Land Oberösterreich v Commission (C-439/05 P & C-454/05 P) [2007] ECR I-7141. 
183 Regulation 1829/2003, art 1 [2003] OJ L 268/1. See also Commission, Report on the 
implementation of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, COM (2006) 626 final (25 October 2006). 
184 Regulation 1829/2003, art 6. 
185 Regulation 178/2002, art 28(1), (4)(d), [2002] OJ L 31/1. The Scientific Committee and 
permanent Scientific Panels of independent scientific experts are responsible for providing 
EFSA’s scientific opinions: art 28(1). 
186 Regulation 1829/2003, arts 5(5), 17(5). 
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and feed, and products likely to be used as both food and feed may be 
authorised under a single application.187
Regulation 1829/2003 governs GMOs for food use, food containing or 
consisting of GMOs, and food produced from or containing ingredients 
produced from GMOs.
 
188 Its requirements apply in a ‘non-discriminatory 
manner’ to both Community and imported products.189 Products that are 
produced with a GMO but have no GM material in the end product (for 
example, food made with GM processing or products from animals fed with 
GM feed) are excluded from regulation.190 GMOs to be used as seeds are 
governed by other measures.191
GM food authorised under Regulation 1829/2003 must have no adverse 
effects on health or the environment, and it must not mislead the consumer or 
differ in a nutritionally adverse way from the food it replaces.
 
192 Authorisation 
involves a scientific evaluation followed by a risk management decision.193 
EFSA prepares its opinion on the basis of scientific analysis and consultation 
with experts and, for GMOs under the one door-one key procedure, with 
Member State competent authorities. After notice and comment, the 
Commission submits a draft decision on the authorisation to the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health.194 The inter-agency 
regulatory procedure, mentioned above, is used to reach final decision on the 
application.195
                                                 
187 Regulation 1829/2003, art 27. This article focuses on authorisation of GM food. See also 
EFSA, Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for the 
Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants and Derived Food and Feed (2006) EFSA 
Journal 99, 1-100 (providing guidance for the preparation and presentation of applications 
within the framework of Regulation 1829/2003).  For information about the 2008 draft update, 
see <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902599947.htm> at 
26 October 2009  
 Authorisation of GM food is valid throughout the Community 
188 Regulation 1829/2003, art 3(1). ‘Produced from GMOs’ means ‘derived, in whole or in part, 
from GMOs, but not containing or consisting of GMOs’: art 2(10). 
189 Regulation 1829/2003, preamble (43). The Regulation takes account of commitments to 
international trade and obligations under the Cartagena Protocol: art 44. 
190 Regulation 1829/2003, preamble (16). 
191 Regulation 1829/2003, preamble (34) and art 6(3)(c). 
192 Regulation 1829/2003, art 4(1). 
193 Regulation 1829/2003, preamble (9). In consultation with EFSA, the Commission has 
enacted detailed rules to guide the preparation of applications. See Commission Regulation 
641/2004 [2004] OJ L 102/14. 
194 Regulation 1829/2003, arts 7(1) and 35(1). 
195 See Regulation 1829/2003, arts 7(3) and 35(2), as amended (referencing Council Decision 
1999/468 [1999] OJ L 184/23). See also Regulation 298/2008 [2008] OJ L 97/64 (amending 
Regulation 1829/2003 to incorporate the regulatory procedure with scrutiny). 
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for ten years and can be renewed.196 The Community Register of Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed lists authorised GM foods.197
C  Traceability and Labelling 
 
Both traceability and labelling are important food safety measures for the 
European Union, and Regulations enacted in 2003 harmonise these 
requirements. 
1  Traceability 
The 2002 General Food Law requires that business operators implement 
systems and procedures (including labelling) to ensure traceability of food, 
feed, and food-producing animals.198 For GMOs specifically, Directive 
2001/18 emphasises the importance of traceability199 and requires labelling. 
Consent to place a GMO on the market is contingent on compliance with 
labelling requirements, including a statement that ‘this product contains 
genetically modified organisms’.200
Regulation 1830/2003 is more specific. Building on Directive 2001/18, it 
defines traceability as ‘the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from 
GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market through the production and 
distribution chains’.
 
201 Traceability is essential to ensure proper labelling, 
monitor environmental and health effects, implement risk management 
measures, and, if necessary, to withdraw food products from the market.202 
The Regulation applies a unified system of traceability to products consisting 
of or containing GMOs, as well as food and feed produced from GMOs.203
                                                 
196 Regulation 1829/2003, arts 7(5) and 11. 
 
197 Regulation 1829/2003, arts 7(5) and 28. The Register is cited above n 136. 
198 Regulation 178/2002, art 18 [2002] OJ L 31/1. The General Food Law defines ‘traceability’ 
as ‘the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended 
to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of production, 
processing and distribution’: art 3(15). 
199 ‘It is necessary to ensure traceability at all stages of the placing on the market of GMOs as 
or in products authorised under [the placing on the market provisions] of this Directive’: 
Directive 2001/18, preamble (42) [2001] OJ L 106/1. 
200 Directive 2001/18, arts 13(2)(f), 19(3)(e), Annex IV.  
201 Regulation 1830/2003, art 3(3) [2003] OJ L 268/24. This definition differs slightly from the 
definition in the General Food Law, quoted above n 198. See Commission, Report on the 
Implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, COM (2008) 560 final (17 September 
2008) (reporting on implementation of the Regulation in the Member States). 
202 Regulation 1830/2003, art 1. 
203 Regulation 1830/2003, art 2(1). 
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If products consist of or contain GMOs, operators (those who place a product 
on the market or receive a product placed on the market)204 must transmit 
prescribed information in writing at the first and all subsequent stages of 
placing on the market. Two types of information are prescribed: a statement 
that the product contains or consists of GMOs and the unique identifier(s) 
assigned to the GMOs. Operators must preserve this information and the 
identity of those from whom the products were received and to whom they 
were made available for five years from each transaction. Pre-packaged 
products must have a statement on a label (for example, ‘This product 
contains genetically modified organisms’), and a display of bulk products 
offered to the final consumer must include similar language.205 For food and 
feed produced from GMOs, the operator must indicate in writing each food 
ingredient produced from GMOs. If no list of ingredients exists, the operator 
must indicate that the product is produced from GMOs. The same five-year 
retention period applies.206
Implementation of Regulation 1830/2003 requires a system of unique 
identifiers for GMOs, established by the Commission.
 
207 All GMOs placed on 
the market are to have a unique identifier, specified in the consent for that 
GMO.208 The applicant for a new GMO develops the unique identifier,209 and 
the Commission has established a central register with information about 
GMOs authorised in the European Union.210
2  Labelling 
 
Regulation 1830/2003 requires labels for products consisting of or containing 
GMOs. Operators must use the phrase ‘This product contains genetically 
modified organisms’ or ‘This product contains genetically modified [name of 
                                                 
204 Regulation 1830/2003, art 3(5)  
205 Regulation 1830/2003, art 4(1), (4), (6). 
206 Regulation 1830/2003, art 5. 
207 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004 of 14 January 2004 Establishing a System for 
the Development and Assignment of Unique Identifiers for Genetically Modified Organisms 
[2004] OJ L 10/5. 
208 The unique identifier is to be registered with the Commission and with the Biosafety 
Clearing-House (<http://bch.biodiv.org/>) established in connection with the Cartagena 
Protocol: Regulation 65/2004 arts 2–3. Identifiers will be coordinated with the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), BioTrack Product Database 
<http://www2.oecd.org/biotech/> at 27 March 2009. 
209 Each identifier has nine alphanumeric digits, divided into three components separated by 
hyphens. The components identify the applicant or consent holder and the transformation 
event, and the final digit is a verification number: Regulation 65/2004, Annex.  
210 See Decision 2004/204 [2004] OJ L 65/20 (enacted under article 31(2) of Directive 
2001/18). 
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the organism(s)]’.211 Regulation 1829/2003 has similar labelling requirements 
for GM food and feed that contains or consists of GMOs or is produced from 
or contains ingredients produced from GMOs. The Regulation provides detail 
about the language required to indicate genetically modified content. In 
addition, labels must identify food that may raise ethical or religious concerns 
and food that is different from its conventional counterpart in composition, 
nutritional value or effects, intended use, or health implications.212
3  Thresholds 
 Regulation 
1829/2003 does not require labelling of products produced with GMOs or 
products from animals fed with GM feed. 
Some products that contain ‘adventitious or technically unavoidable’ traces of 
authorised GMOs may not have to be labelled, and some traceability 
requirements will not apply to those products.213 Regulation 1830/2003 states 
that ‘traces of GMOs in products’ do not trigger traceability and labelling 
requirements if the traces do not exceed the threshold set in Directive 
2001/18.214 For products intended for direct processing, Directive 2001/18 
indicates that labelling is not required for adventitious or technically 
unavoidable traces of authorised GMOs of no more than 0.9 per cent, but 
lower thresholds can be established.215 For products intended for direct food 
or feed use or for processing, Regulation 1829/2003 prescribes the threshold: 
0.9 per cent of food ingredients considered individually or food consisting of 
a single ingredient.216 The European Community has not yet established a 
threshold for traces of authorised GM seeds, as permitted by Directive 
2001/18.217
                                                 
211 Regulation 1830/2003, art 4(6) [2003] OJ L 268/24, 26. For pre-packaged products, the 
words must appear on the label; for non-pre-packaged products, on or in connection with the 
product display. Specific labelling requirements in other EC legislations continue to apply. 
 
212 Regulation 1829/2003, arts 12–14 [2003] OJ L 268/1, 11–12, as amended. Labelling rules 
for feed, in art 25, are similar, though not identical. 
213 To prove that the presence of GM material is adventitious or technically avoidable, 
operators must be able to show that they have taken appropriate steps to avoid the presence of 
GM material: Regulation 1829/2003, art 12(3). 
214 Regulation 1830/2003, art 4(7). 
215 See Directive 2001/18, art 21(3) (amended by Regulation 1830/2003, art 7). Threshold 
setting follows the regulatory process with scrutiny, described above in n 175. 
216 Regulation 1829/2003, art 12(2). After crops lose authorisation, the 0.9 percent adventitious 
presence threshold applies for five years. See Commission Decision (EC) 2007/304 on the 
Withdrawal from the Market of Bt176 (SYN-EV176-9) Maize and its Derived Products [2007] 
OJ L117/4. 
217 Directive 2001/18, art 21(2) (referring to ‘products where adventitious or technically 
unavoidable traces of authorized GMOs cannot be excluded’). See Draft Commission 
Decision Establishing Minimum Thresholds for Adventitious or Technically Unavoidable 
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4  Coexistence 
Producers prefer to keep the adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM 
crops and products below the regulatory threshold to avoid the obligation to 
label products as GMOs. Thus, it is critical to develop and implement 
management and marketing practices to ensure that pollen drift or 
commingling do not result in adventitious presence of GMOs and that various 
systems of agriculture (traditional, GM, and organic) can coexist.218 For the 
European Commission, the term coexistence ‘refers to the ability of farmers to 
make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop 
production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or 
purity standards’.219
In a 2003 Recommendation, the Commission issued policy guidelines for 
coexistence.
 
220 The Commission did not require any particular type of policy 
instrument, but welcomed voluntary agreements, legislation, soft law, or a 
combination of these instruments, designed to ‘achieve effective 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and control of the measures’.221 
Commission guidelines, which apply ‘from the seed to the silo’, are non-
binding recommendations that address commercial seed and crop production, 
with a focus on technical segregation measures and economic consequences 
of admixtures of GM and non-GM crops.222
                                                                                                                    
Traces of Genetically Modified Seeds in other Products (2004) 
<http://www.saveourseeds.org/downloads/com_draft_seeds_04_2004.pdf> at 27 March 2009. 
 They are not measures to be 
adopted, but instead offer Member States general principles to apply and 
factors to consider in designing national measures. For example, the 
Commission suggested that management measures be based on the best 
available scientific evidence, which would permit cultivation of both GM and 
non-GM crops and ensure that adventitious presence of GM material in non-
GM crops remains below labelling thresholds. Measures should emphasise 
farm-scale management and encourage cooperation and voluntary 
arrangements between farmers. Moreover, operators who introduce a new 
production type should be responsible for limiting gene flow, and farmers 
who plan to grow GM varieties should inform neighbours. In addition, the 
218 For details on coexistence, see Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘The Coexistence of GM and 
Other Crops in the European Union’ (2007) 16 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 324. 
219 Commission Recommendation 2003/556 on Guidelines for the Development of National 
Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with 
Conventional and Organic Farming [2003] OJ L189/36, 39. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid Annex § 2.1.8. 
222 Ibid Annex § 1.5. The authorisation process considers health and environmental risks, which 
are not at issue for coexistence. 
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Commission recommended production, harvest, and post-harvest practices to 
achieve coexistence.223
Thus, the European Community has not enacted regulatory measures for 
coexistence. Instead, the Commission has relied on subsidiarity
 
224 to leave 
enactment of coexistence measures to Member States which, under Directive 
2001/18, ‘may take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of 
GMOs in other products’.225 In April 2009, the Commission issued a report on 
coexistence,226 which reviews the Commission’s own activities227
The Commission Report indicated that 15 Member States have adopted 
legislation for coexistence, and three others have notified the Commission of 
draft legislation. Measures vary among the States, but include mandatory 
training for producers who grow GM crops and notification of proposed GM 
crops to landlords, neighbours, those who share machinery, and even 
beekeepers. A GM crop register informs the public, though the level of detail 
required in Member States varies. Seed dealers may have obligations to report 
sales of GM seeds or to inform producers about coexistence rules.
 and 
summarises Member State progress toward enactment of coexistence 
measures. 
228
                                                 
223 Ibid Annex §§ 2–3. 
 
224 Subsidiarity, one of the principles governing the European Community, ensures that 
decisions are made as close to citizens as possible. ‘In areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects 
of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community’: EC Treaty, art 5. 
225 Directive 2001/18, art 26a(1), as amended by Regulation 1829/2003, art 43 [2003] OJ L 
268/1. 
226 Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Farming, 
COM (2009) 153 final (2 April 2009). The 2009 report indicates significant Member State 
progress since a 2006 report: Commission, Report on the Implementation of National 
Measures on the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic 
Farming, COM (2006) 104 final (9 March 2006).  
227 For example, the Commission established the European Coexistence Bureau, to provide 
technical help with coexistence. In cooperation with Member States, the Bureau is developing 
crop-specific guidelines and best agricultural management practices for coexistence. A best 
practice document for maize production is expected by 2010: Commission, COM (2009) 153, 
above n 226, 4. See European Coexistence Bureau, Joint Research Centre, Home Page 
<http://ecob.jrc.ec.europe.eu/> at 19 April 2009. 
228 Commission, COM (2009) 153, above n 226, 5–6. Though the Commission knew of no 
reports of economic damage, Member State liability rules, which are diverse, may eventually 
be relevant: at 9. 
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Twelve Member States have enacted technical segregation measures, 
normally expressed as isolation distances between GM and non-GM fields. 
Most national measures focus on maize, but some Member States specify 
distances for potato, sugar beet, and other crops. Buffer zones (pollen barriers, 
where crops must be treated as GM plants) may also be required. In six 
Member States, producers must follow stricter isolation distances between 
GM and organic fields than between GM and conventional crops. In general, 
the producer who grows GM crops bears responsibility for maintaining 
segregation measures. Some Member States have enacted measures to prevent 
commingling of GM and other crops during harvest, transport and storage, as 
well as during production. Coexistence measures in the majority of Member 
States are designed so that adventitious presence will not exceed the 0.9 per 
cent threshold for labelling, though a few States aim at the lowest possible 
level of admixture.229
Because only GM maize can be cultivated legally in the European Union, and 
few hectares are grown, Member States have little experience in monitoring 
the effectiveness of their coexistence measures. The Commission does not 
intend to propose Community coexistence rules. Instead, it will continue to 
provide research and guidance for coexistence. It recommends that Member 
State measures be assessed for effectiveness and efficiency and for their 
impact on producer competitiveness and freedom of choice for consumers and 
producers.
  
230
D  EC Plans for Improved Implementation 
 
The European Community Directives and Regulations discussed here make 
up a comprehensive legal framework for authorisation of GMOs and their 
food and feed products. Nonetheless, questions about the effect of GMOs on 
health and the environment remain, and the European Council has called for 
improvements in implementation of the legislative measures discussed above. 
At the Environmental Council meeting in December 2008, the Council 
identified several important areas for improvement.231
The Council indicated that environmental assessment and monitoring of 
genetically modified plants should be strengthened. The Commission has 
asked EFSA to review its guidelines for environmental risk assessment, 
 
                                                 
229 Ibid 6–7. Prohibitions of GM crops are not considered coexistence measures. 
230 Ibid 10. The Commission’s Report is accompanied by a Commission Staff Working 
Document, SEC (2009) 408 final, with detailed information about Member State coexistence 
measures. 
231 European Council, ‘Council Conclusions on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), 
2912th Environment Council Meeting, Brussels’ (Press Release, 4 December 2008). 
2009 AUTHORISATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 295 
particularly long-term environmental effects. That review should consider 
environmental consequences of changes in herbicide use in connection with 
herbicide-tolerant GMOs and examine the ‘coherence’ between risk 
assessments of GM plants that produce pesticides and of the pesticides 
themselves.232 The Council noted that Member State assessment practices 
should be harmonised, and that new procedures should ensure that GMOs are 
monitored effectively after commercialisation. Moreover, the Council would 
like an assessment of the socio-economic benefits and risks of GMOs, which 
can be considered in risk management. Member State information about 
socio-economic effects should lead to a Commission report to Council and 
Parliament. The Council emphasised the important role of Member States in 
the assessment of GMOs for cultivation and encouraged the more effective 
and transparent use of scientific expertise in assessing risks of cultivation of 
GMOs or their use in food and feed.233
The Council noted that the Commission will complete a study on the 
establishment of seed thresholds and reaffirmed the need for labelling 
thresholds for the adventitious presence of GMOs in conventional seeds. The 
Council insisted that thresholds should be ‘at the lowest practicable, 
proportionate and functional levels for all economic operators, [and] must 
contribute to ensuring freedom of choice to producers and consumers of 
conventional, organic and GM products alike’.
 
234
Finally, the Council focused on regional and local characteristics of Member 
States. The Council recognised the possibility, consistent with the 
precautionary principle,
 The Council invited the 
Commission to set those thresholds as soon as possible, using current 
scientific information. 
235 of imposing restrictions, or even prohibitions, on 
GMOs in fragile ecosystems, and especially protected natural habitats. The 
Council reminded Member States of their right to enact national measures to 
ensure coexistence of GM and other crops. The Council also noted that GMO-
free zones could be created by voluntary agreement of farmers, but that 
freedom of choice requires all farmers in the region to be informed about the 
plan to create a GMO-free zone.236
                                                 
232 Ibid 2. Plant protection products are governed by Council Directive 91/414 Concerning the 
Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market [2001] OJ L 230/1, as amended. 
Consolidated text: CONSLEG 1991L0414-01/01/2004. 
 
233 European Council, above n 231. 
234 Ibid 4. 
235 On the precautionary principle, see the discussion in Part IVC of this article. 
236 European Council, above n 231, 5. 
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IV  AUTHORISATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARISON 
A  Attitudes toward GMOs 
Attitudes towards GM crops and foods differ significantly in the United States 
and the European Community, and those attitudes may influence aspects of 
the regulatory process. Government policy in the United States is generally 
positive toward GMOs and poses few obstacles to their widespread cultivation 
and consumption. The European Community officially favours GMOs,237 too, 
though a Commission report indicated that ‘the EU is often not at the 
forefront of development, eg in ... GM crops’.238
Moreover, attitudes of producers and consumers contrast. In the United States, 
producers favour GMOs, as evidenced by statistics indicating that the 
majority of corn, soybean, and cotton hectares are GM.
 Despite official policy, and 
in violation of EC law, several Member States and numerous regions have 
banned cultivation of GM crops. 
239 In the European 
Community, where only GM maize can be cultivated and few producers 
actually grow the GM maize, many farmers are dubious about GM crops. Yet 
in some Member States, farmers are eager to grow GM crops; in Denmark, for 
example, farmers would like to grow GM maize and a GM potato.240
Similarly, most consumers in the United States seem to have positive or, at 
worst, neutral attitudes towards GMOs. Though consumers are not always 
well-informed about GM food products, few avoid GM foods or express 
concerns about the safety of biotech food, and a majority would buy GM 
foods.
 
241 Until recently, however, US consumers have faced few food safety 
issues, and most consumers have little reason to mistrust the federal agencies 
that regulate GMOs. In contrast, the BSE crisis242
                                                 
237 Commission, above n 11.  
 and other food crises in 
Europe have triggered consumer mistrust of government and even science, so 
consumer hesitation about GMOs, even in the face of comprehensive 
regulation, is not surprising. Consumers have continued to trust NGOs, 
238 Eleni Zika et al, Consequences, Opportunities and Challenges of Modern Biotechnology for 
Europe (JRC Report EUR 22728, 2007) 8. 
239 See generally James, above n 2. 
240 ‘Danish Farmers to Grow GM Crops’ (2008) GMO Compass <http://www.gmo-compass. 
org/eng/news/383.docu.html> at 14 October 2009 (citing a report in The Copenhagen Post). 
241 International Food Information Council, above n 10, 2008 Topline Data. 
242 For more information on BSE, see Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘Animal Identification and 
Traceability under the US National Animal Identification System’ (2006) Journal of Food 
Law and Policy 231, 235–41. 
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including Greenpeace,243 an organisation that opposes GMOs. One scholar 
suggested that ‘GM politics in the EU can be understood partially as a 
defensive strategy of authorities to regain credibility with the public ...’.244 
Even with stringent regulation, however, consumer scepticism and opposition 
remain. In several EC Member States (for example, France, Germany, and 
others), vandals have destroyed field trials of GM crops, a situation that may 
have led to prohibition of GM research in two German universities.245
B  Regulatory Requirements 
 
1  Regulatory Approaches 
Both the United States and the European Community regulate GMOs and GM 
foods to protect public health and the environment (including agriculture). 
The regulatory approaches, however, differ in a number of important respects. 
Earlier Parts of this article provide details, and the discussion below highlights 
a few significant differences. 
In the United States, the approach to GMOs can be characterised, in general, 
as product-oriented. That is, the focus is on the product itself, rather than the 
process (genetic modification) by which it was created. As a result, the United 
States has relied on existing statutes, instead of enacting new laws specifically 
designed for GMOs. Under those existing laws, however, some GM products 
may escape comprehensive review; the concepts of substantial equivalence 
and GRAS, discussed above, are examples. In the United States, statutory 
amendments, new regulations, and agency guidelines adopted since the 1980s 
have applied to GMOs and their products.  
In contrast, the European Community adopted a process-oriented regulatory 
approach, which focuses on the process by which the new variety was created. 
Under the European Community’s process-oriented regulatory approach, of 
course, each product is regulated, but the process of genetic modification 
triggers a careful look at the product. The European Community’s focus on 
                                                 
243 See Bernd van der Meulen, ‘The EU Regulatory Approach to GM Foods’ (2007) Kansas 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 286, 297–8. Greenpeace ‘opposes the release of GMOs into 
the environment as there is not adequate scientific understanding of their impact on human 
health and the environment. GMOs pose unpredictable and irreversible long-term risks’: 
Greenpeace European Unit, Sustainable Agriculture and GMOs 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/campaigns/say-no-to-genetic-engineering> at 11 May 
2009. 
244 van der Meulen, above n 243, 297. 
245 Henry I Miller, Auf Wiedersehen, agbiotech (Letter to the Editor) (2008) 26(9) Nature 
Biotechnology 974. 
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the process of genetic modification led to enactment of measures designed for 
GMOs, beginning in 1990. The approval process in the European Union is 
complex and can take twice as long as the procedure in the United States and 
some other nations.246
The allocation of regulatory responsibility differs. In the United States, federal 
law governs authorisation of GMOs and their products, and federal 
regulations and guidelines provide detailed requirements for authorisation. 
Federal agencies (the USDA, FDA and EPA) implement those laws and 
regulations. Though states receive information, and some states impose other 
requirements, states do not play a role in the authorisation process. Instead, 
the process is more centralised. Moreover, few states have acted to ban or 
restrict the cultivation of GM varieties. 
 
In the European Community, however, Member States play a significant role. 
The authorisation process starts with an application to the Member State 
competent authority, and Member States have other responsibilities (for 
example, establishing a register of GM releases). Member States implement 
Directive 2009/41 (recasting Directive 90/219) on contained use and, acting 
through their competent authorities, authorise releases for field tests and 
research under Directive 2001/18. Though Member States can authorise a 
GMO for placing on the market, objections from other States trigger a 
Community procedure. Under Regulation 1829/2003 on food and feed, 
Member States play a role, but EFSA’s significant responsibilities under that 
Regulation make the process more centralised. As the discussion above 
indicates, EC law provides safeguards for Member States with scientific 
reasons for preventing cultivation of GM crops, and several States have used 
those safeguards to ban cultivation of GM maize. 
In the United States, regulation of GMOs is rather sectoral; applicable law and 
regulations are related to the sector (for example, agriculture, environment, 
food) in which the GMO or its product will be used. Agencies with expertise 
in that sector implement the authorisation process. These agencies coordinate 
their activities to avoid asynchronous authorisation; that is, the USDA will not 
usually deregulate a GM variety until the applicant has consulted with the 
FDA on food and feed uses.  
In the European Community, early legislation was more horizontal (that is, 
not related to the proposed use of the GMO or its product), but the enactment 
of Regulation 1829/2003 on food and feed took a more sectoral approach. 
Nonetheless, the likelihood that both a GMO and its food and feed products 
                                                 
246 Gé Backus et al, EU Policy on GMOs: A Quick Scan of the Economic Consequences (LEI 
Report 2008-070, October 2008) 7. 
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will be authorised adds complexity because both horizontal measures (for 
example, the Directives for contained release and deliberate release) and 
sectoral measures (for example, Regulation 1829/2003) will apply. The one 
door-one key procedure mentioned above helps to make the authorisation 
process more efficient. 
2  Labelling 
Another significant difference between US and EC regulation of GMOs and 
their products relates to labelling. Labels facilitate traceability, and labels on 
food products provide information to consumers. When GM food is at issue, 
consumer interest may reflect ethical preferences that go beyond issues of 
health and safety.247
In the European Community, GMOs and their products must be labelled if 
GM content exceeds the rather low (0.9 per cent) threshold of GM content. 
Moreover, to avoid labelling, the GM content below that threshold must be 
adventitious or technically unavoidable. In Europe, where consumers have 
expressed strong concerns about GM food, labels seem to be an important 
component of the consumer’s right to choose.
 In the United States, labels are generally not required for 
GMOs or their products. The FDA does not consider most GM foods to be 
materially different from their conventional counterparts and has therefore not 
required labels, despite some consumer demand. Labels can be required, 
however, if GM foods differ significantly from their conventional 
counterparts and raise health or ethical issues. 
248 In a study on consumer 
behaviour in 10 Member States concluded in 2008, however, researchers 
found that ‘most shoppers did not actively avoid GM products, suggesting that 
they are not greatly concerned with the GM issue’.249 Consumers do want 
freedom of choice, but in the context of that freedom, ‘GM-products offered 
for sale are indeed purchased’.250
                                                 
247 See Peter H Sand, ‘Labelling Genetically Modified Food: The Right to Know’ (2006) 15 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 185, 186. 
Sand notes that at least 20 other countries require labels, albeit with different thresholds: at 
186–7. 
  
248 On labelling in the context of the WTO, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and Codex 
Alimentarius, see ibid. 
249 Vivian Moses et al, Do European Consumers Buy GM Food? (Final Report, European 
Commission Project No 518435, 14 October 2008) 1-9 – 1-10.  
250 Ibid 1-10. 
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C  Exercise of Precaution 
One perceived difference between regulation of GMOs and their products in 
the United States and Europe appears in the application of the precautionary 
principle. The precautionary principle251 indicates that, in situations where 
scientific uncertainty exists, that lack of certainty should not delay adoption of 
preventive measures.252 The EC Treaty adopted the precautionary principle as 
a guiding principle of environmental law,253 implemented in measures that 
affect the environment, agriculture, and food safety (as well as other areas). 
Decisions of the European Court of Justice have applied the principle in cases 
involving risk assessment and risk management.254
EC regulation of GMOs invokes the precautionary principle explicitly (for 
example, in Directive 2001/18 and Regulation 1830/2003),
 Although the United 
States has not adopted the principle formally, the United States takes a 
precautionary approach to food safety and the environment. US statutes and 
regulations often require precaution, and court decisions implement these 
requirements. 
255
Both regulatory systems require risk assessments, which rely in part on 
information provided by the applicant, for release of GMs into the 
environment. In the European Community, field trials and marketing of GM 
products require full environmental risk assessments. In the United States, 
large-scale field trials trigger risk assessment by the USDA and (for PIPs) by 
 while US 
regulatory measures do not refer to the principle. Nonetheless, in both the 
European Community and the United States, precaution plays a role in 
regulatory measures that ensure that GMOs and their products do not 
compromise food safety or harm the environment. 
                                                 
251 A commonly cited formulation of precaution appears in the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, Prin 15, UN DOC A/CONF 151/5/Rev 1 (14 June 1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 
874, 879: ‘[T]o protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ 
252 See Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘Origin, Status and Effects of the Precautionary Principle’ in 
Nicolas de Sadeleer (ed), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Approaches from the 
Nordic Countries, EU and USA (2007) 3. 
253 EC Treaty, art 174(2). 
254 See Helle Tegner Anker and Margaret Rosso Grossman, ‘Authorization of Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Precaution in US and EC Law’ (2009) European Food and Feed Law 
Review 3, 9–11 (discussing ECJ decisions). 
255 Regulation 2001/18, art 1 [2001] OJ L 106/1; Directive 1830/2003, preamble (3) [2003] OJ 
L 268/24. Though Regulation 1829/2003 does not mention the principle specifically, it refers 
to the General Food Law, Regulation 178/2002, art 7(1) [2002] OJ L 31/1, which does invoke 
the principle. 
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the EPA, but some less risky GMOs and small-scale field trials get less 
stringent oversight. In the European Community, all GM foods are subject to 
a stringent environmental risk assessment with a focus on human health and 
environment. In the United States, the concept of substantial equivalence 
means that most GM foods, which do not differ significantly from their non-
GM counterparts, are not assessed. Most non-pesticidal GMOs are generally 
recognised as safe (GRAS) and are not regulated as food additives. Yet these 
foods do not escape scrutiny; voluntary consultations with the FDA ensure 
review.256
Risk management, which relies on data from risk assessment, determines 
whether a GMO or GM product will be authorised and, if so, whether special 
risk management measures are required. To protect the environment, both the 
United States and the European Union condition authorisation on the absence 
of adverse effects – for example, the absence of adverse effects on health or 
environment (EC) or the likelihood that GMOs or GM products will not pose 
a plant pest risk or cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment 
(US). The European Community, however, requires post-market monitoring 
of GMOs, a precaution not yet required in the US. In the European 
Community, no GM food can be authorised until the absence of adverse 
effects has been demonstrated, and post-market monitoring follows 
authorisation. In the United States, however, the FDA does not formally 
authorise most new GM foods, nor does the EPA require food residue 
tolerances for most PIPs. Thus, though both the European Community and the 
United States apply precautionary standards in assessing the risk of GMOs 
and their products, the EC carries the precaution beyond authorisation into the 
marketplace. Therefore ‘the role of precaution in risk management appears to 
be stronger in the EC than in the US’.
 
257
V CONCLUSION 
 
In the years since the United States published its Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology and the European Community enacted its earliest 
Directives to govern GMOs, numerous GM crops and their products have 
been commercialised. Farmers began to plant those crops in 1996, and steady 
increases in GM production have occurred. The 2008 global market value 
(sale of seed plus technology fees) of GM crops was estimated at US $7.5 
billion and is projected to be US $8.3 billion in 2009. Further increases in GM 
production are expected. Additional countries may cultivate GM crops, and 
                                                 
256 Anker and Grossman, above n 254, 14–17. 
257 Ibid 14, 18–20. 
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the number of farmers planting biotech crops may increase significantly, 
especially in developing countries. New GM crops and traits will also expand 
production.258
Many commercialised GM crops were developed in the United States and 
authorised under the regulatory system described in this article. They are 
cultivated and consumed in the United States and in other nations. Under the 
lengthy approval process in the European Community, fewer GM varieties 
have been authorised for food, feed, or processing uses there, and only GM 
maize is authorised for cultivation. Thus, not all GMOs approved in the 
United States can be imported into Europe. Moreover, because the EU food 
industry is reluctant to market GM food products, most GM products sold in 
Europe (primarily soy and maize) are used for animal feed.
 
259
This situation of asynchronous approvals and the European Community’s 
strict prohibition of imports of GMOs not yet approved in the EC has 
engendered conflict. Two issues, discussed in reports written in Europe – one 
by a research group and the other by the European Commission itself – 
illustrate this conflict.  
 
One issue is the availability of livestock feed. In 2007, the EU Commissioner 
for Agriculture and Rural Development noted that European reluctance to 
import GM livestock feed increased the cost of feed for pigs and poultry and 
could threaten the livestock industry.260 A 2008 Dutch study corroborated this 
statement.261 The European livestock industry, which imports about 77 per 
cent of protein feed, depends on imported soy and maize products. Zero 
tolerance of unapproved GMOs means that livestock producers face higher 
costs for non-GM soy, and in some cases producers may not be able to import 
protein-rich feedstuffs. The lack of feed ingredients will affect the 
competitiveness of European Union livestock production, and ‘European 
livestock operators will lose market share in domestic and world markets to 
foreign competitors’.262
                                                 
258 James, above n 2.  
 Because livestock production is about 40 per cent of 
total EU agricultural production, loss of market share will have significant 
financial implications. 
259 Commission, Report, above n 201, 2. 
260 James Kanter, ‘European Official Faults Ban on Genetically Altered Feed’, The New York 
Times (New York), 27 November 2007. 
261 Backus et al, above n 246, 54. The study identified problems, including disruptions of trade, 
caused by asynchronous EC approval of GM crops and its zero tolerance threshold. 
262 Ibid 55. 
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Similar issues, focused on importing non-GM raw materials, will face the 
food industry if it becomes more hospitable to GM foods.263 The Dutch study 
concludes ‘that it is likely that in the near future problems will become more 
urgent. This could negatively affect the EU supply of raw materials and 
economic position of the European agricultural and food sector’.264
In addition, EC requirements for traceability and labelling (especially in 
Regulation 1830/2003) impose burdens on trading partners. According to a 
Commission report, Member States believe that traceability and labelling help 
to achieve ‘more informed choice, more efficient prevention of deceptive 
practices and better official controls’.
 
265 Research indicates that traceability 
helps to foster confidence in food safety and to encourage sale of non-GM 
products.266 From a different point of view, however, exporters who cannot 
sell GM products claim that, as a result, potential buyers are forced to buy 
more expensive non-GM products. Exporters find labelling thresholds 
arbitrary and ‘claim that labelling products produced from GMOs, where no 
GM material can be detected, places an unfair burden on operators in the food 
and feed sector’.267 The Commission disagrees, however, and believes that 
‘consumer demand for non-GM products, higher prices in the feed sector and 
asynchronous approval for GMOs between countries’ have affected trade 
more significantly.268
Both the United States and the European Community authorise GMOs and 
their products under comprehensive regulatory schemes, intended to ensure 
that GMOs do not harm health, the environment, or agriculture. Opinions 
differ about the effectiveness of regulatory oversight, of course, but both 
regulatory schemes allow a GM variety that meets regulatory requirements to 
be authorised. Though EC regulatory measures seem more complex than 
those in the United States, differences in legal requirements, by themselves, 
do not seem to account for the European Community’s hesitation to allow 
cultivation of additional GMOs or the limited number of varieties authorised 
for feed and food use. Instead, underlying attitudes of producers and 
 These different viewpoints highlight the controversy 
about the impact of EC traceability and labelling requirements. 
                                                 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid 56. 
265 Commission, Report, above n 201, 7. 
266 Ibid 3 (citing Eurobarometer 64.3, Europeans and Biotechnology in 2005: Patterns and 
Trends). 
267 Commission, Report, above n 201, 7. Furthermore, ‘[o]ne overseas association expressed 
concern at the fact that EU food processors and retailers had stopped using soybean oil from 
the US, because the resulting food and feed products would be labeled as GM even if no DNA 
from the modification appears in the oil, and deplored the fact that such products required 
labelling’: at 4. 
268 Ibid 7. 
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consumers, as well as political considerations, may help to explain many of 
the contentious issues raised by GMOs and the reluctance of the European 
Union to embrace GM technology. 
